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POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING 
Michael R. Siebecker* 
 
Should the same legal principles that prohibit insider trading require 
corporations to disclose their political spending as well?  The question 
seems particularly important in light of the increasing dominance of 
corporations in the political realm, the lack of transparency regarding 
corporate political activity, and the inherently suspicious motives of 
corporate executives who use corporate treasuries to advance their 
personal political preferences.  This Article examines how the fiduciary 
principles of trust that underpin prohibitions on insider trading could 
inform and enhance the content of the general fiduciary duties that 
corporate officers and directors owe to their shareholders.  Although 
insider trading prohibitions rest on the statutory foundation of federal 
securities law, the U.S. Supreme Court extrapolates the content of insider 
trading doctrine from the overarching common law fiduciary duties that 
govern the daily decisions of corporate managers.  In the insider trading 
context, however, the Supreme Court has articulated a special disclosure 
obligation based on those fiduciary duties that is not currently recognized 
in other areas of corporate law.  In particular, the Supreme Court requires 
that to avoid liability for illicit insider trading, a corporate insider who 
possesses material nonpublic information must either disclose that 
information to shareholders prior to trading or abstain from trading 
altogether. 
A fiduciary breach due to secret use of corporate assets for personal gain 
marks the essential concern in both the insider trading realm and in the 
context of corporate political spending.  Therefore, adopting a similar 
common law fiduciary rule that corporate managers must disclose the 
amount and target of political expenditures or refrain from engaging in 
political activity does not seem like much of an intellectual leap.  Not only 
would such a common law disclosure duty fit neatly within existing 
corporate governance principles, but the compelled transparency would not 
offend corporations’ First Amendment rights.  In the end, prohibiting 
political insider trading through a “disclose or abstain” rule for corporate 
political spending would promote greater efficiency in the capital markets, 
ensure corporate accountability and political legitimacy, and sustain the 
growing market for corporate social responsibility.  
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. B.A., Yale; J.D., LL.M., 
Ph.D., Columbia.  For helpful insights and suggestions, I express special thanks to Bernard 
Chao, Kevin Lynch, Justin Pidot, and Tim Thein. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Should the same legal principles that prohibit insider trading require 
corporations to disclose their political spending as well?  The question 
seems particularly important in light of the increasing dominance of 
corporations in the political realm, the lack of transparency regarding 
corporate political activity, and the inherently suspicious motives of 
corporate executives who use corporate treasuries to advance their personal 
political preferences. 
This Article intends to examine how the fiduciary principles of trust that 
underpin prohibitions on insider trading could inform and enhance the 
content of the general fiduciary duties that corporate officers and directors 
owe to their shareholders.  Although insider trading prohibitions rest on the 
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statutory foundation of federal securities law,1 the U.S. Supreme Court 
extrapolates the content of insider trading doctrine from the overarching 
common law fiduciary duties that govern the daily decisions of corporate 
managers.2  In the insider trading context, however, the Supreme Court has 
articulated a special disclosure obligation based on those fiduciary duties 
that are not currently recognized in other areas of corporate law.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court requires that to avoid liability for illicit 
insider trading, a corporate insider who possesses material nonpublic 
information must either disclose that information to shareholders prior to 
trading or abstain from trading altogether.3  That disclosure requirement 
arises from the basic notion that corporate insiders cannot use company 
assets (i.e., information) for personal gain at the expense of shareholders to 
whom corporate insiders owe a duty of trust.4  Only through disclosure of 
the material nonpublic information prior to trading with existing or 
potential shareholders could corporate insiders ensure a level playing field 
and avoid upending their fundamental fiduciary obligations. 
With that in mind, might the same fiduciary-based disclosure duty 
articulated in the context of insider trading be applied in the context of 
corporate political spending?  Answering that question depends on whether 
trading based on material nonpublic information represents a sufficiently 
similar breach of trust as failing to disclose corporate political spending.  
Obviously, using the corporate treasury for political spending certainly does 
not involve trading in company securities.  But in light of the rather tenuous 
connection between corporate profitability and political spending,5 using 
corporate funds to affect elections raises the specter of corporate insiders 
using company assets to advance their own personal interests, potentially to 
 
 1. See Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress:  Legislator Insider Trading 
and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 854–56 (2013). 
 2. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary 
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1317–22 (2009). 
 3. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 734–35 (2006). 
 4. The fiduciary relationship exists not just between the insider and existing 
shareholders but to potential shareholders as well. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222, 227 n.8 (1980) (quoting Judge Learned Hand’s statement in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)); see also Nagy, supra note 2, at 1338 (“Chiarella maintained, 
however, that it would be a ‘sorry distinction’ to recognize fiduciary duties between a 
shareholder and an insider but not to recognize such duties in the very transaction where the 
person became a shareholder.  As Professor Victor Brudney observed, it is more than a little 
ironic ‘that the Supreme Court, in its efforts to narrow the scope of the disclosure 
requirements of Section 10(b), assumed, and in some sense may have furthered, broad local 
fiduciary law disclosure obligations of management and controllers.’” (quoting Victor 
Brudney, O’Hagan’s Problems, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 255 n.15)). 
 5. See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After 
Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 658 (2012); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, 
Safeguarding Markets from Pernicious Pay to Play:  A Model Explaining Why the SEC 
Regulates Money in Politics, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 361, 392–94 (2013); Alison Frankel, 
Why Shield Corporations from Disclosing Political Spending?, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/12/16/why-shield-corporations-from-disclosing-
political-spending/ [https://perma.cc/7R58-YM3C]. 
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the detriment of the corporation.6  Although corporate managers could 
easily claim that political spending advances the interests of the company 
rather than their own predilections, there is simply no way for shareholders 
to assess the existence of a breach of trust without disclosure.7  As some of 
the most important political decisions get made behind corporate 
boardroom doors, ensuring that managers cannot co-opt corporate coffers 
for illicit personal benefit seems of paramount importance. 
To assess the feasibility and desirability of incorporating the disclosure 
obligation from insider trading doctrine into the fiduciary duties governing 
corporate political spending, Part I describes the hostile acquisition of 
American politics by corporations.  Part II explicates the doctrine and 
fiduciary foundations that gave rise to an affirmative disclosure duty on the 
part of corporate insiders interested in trading based on material nonpublic 
information.  Moving from the problem to a potential solution, Part III 
discusses how a fiduciary-based disclosure obligation in the context of 
political spending might prevent managers from using the corporate 
treasury to promote their own personal interests at the expense of the 
company.  Part IV addresses any constitutional impediments to adopting a 
common law disclosure rule for corporate political spending.  Part V 
explores a variety of potential advantages and drawbacks to extending 
insider trading principles to corporate spending practices.  Finally, this 
Article concludes that extending a fiduciary-based disclosure obligation 
from insider trading doctrine to the context of corporate political spending 
would promote efficiency in the capital markets, ensure corporate 
accountability and political legitimacy, and sustain the growing market for 
corporate social responsibility. 
I.  THE POLITICAL CORPORATION 
The practical impetus for considering a corporate political spending 
disclosure rule based on insider trading principles stems from the 
dominance of corporations in the political realm.  The concentration of 
political power in the hands of corporate boards makes the potential for 
corruption through secret use of corporate assets of paramount concern.  
Although concerted efforts on a variety of fronts have tried to stem the 
opportunities for deceit, corporate managers remain largely free to use 
corporate coffers to advance secret political agendas. 
A.  The Hostile Acquisition of American Politics 
In the early part of the twentieth century, Adolph Berle and Gardiner 
Means predicted in The Modern Corporation and Private Property that the 
 
 6. James Kwak, Citizens United v. FEC Turns 2—And It’s Still Wrong, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
20, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/citizens-united-v-fec-turns-
2-and-its-still-wrong/251706/ (“[I]f corporations’ political spending were left up to 
individuals, like executives or directors, those individuals could advance their personal 
interests by directing money to their preferred political organizations.”) [https://perma.cc/ 
R2JQ-PCBM]. 
 7. See Editorial, Keeping Shareholders in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, at A32. 
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corporation would evolve to surpass government as the most powerful 
institution in society.8  Indeed, the political influence of corporations and 
their control over important facets of our daily lives9 grew rapidly as 
corporations amassed vast amounts of capital.10  The potential for political 
control of our collective lives under an unaccountable cloak of anonymity 
frames the problem of political insider trading. 
1.  Monopolizing the Market 
With respect to the growing political influence of corporations, the 
Supreme Court gave big business a new type of jurisprudential rocket fuel 
with its decision in Citizens United v. FEC.11  In that landmark case, the 
Court gave corporations essentially the same political speech rights as 
human beings12 and held unconstitutional any limits on the amount of 
independent political expenditures13 that corporations could make in an 
election.14  In the immediate aftermath of Citizens United, many predicted 
that corporate dominance of the political arena would infect irreparably 
American democratic processes.15  At the time, President Barack Obama 
warned that “a new stampede of special interest money in our politics” 
 
 8. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 357 (1932). 
 9. See Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism:  Berle and Means and 20th-
Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 179–80 (2005). 
 10. See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
2353, 2354–55, 2361–64 (2007); Arthur S. Miller, Corporations and Our Two Constitutions, 
in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY:  POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 241, 242 (Warren J. Samuels & 
Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (stating that corporations’ “power and influence, both externally 
in the national political order and internally in the so-called corporate community, make 
them a true form of governance”). 
 11. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 12. Id. at 319. 
 13. According to the Federal Election Commission, “[A]n independent expenditure is an 
expenditure for a communication which expressly advocates the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate and which is made independently from the candidate’s 
campaign.” The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/ 
pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Independent_Expenditures (last updated Feb. 2017) [https:// 
perma.cc/UJA2-RQ58]. 
 14. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342–46. 
 15. See Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5 Years, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 
2015/01/21/5-years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics (“In its Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission decision, the court opened the campaign spending 
floodgates.”) [https://perma.cc/6NFD-TWSJ]; Christopher P. Skroupa, Investors Want 
Disclosure of Corporate Political Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures, FORBES (Apr. 
20, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/2012/04/20/investors-
want-disclosure-of-corporate-political-contributions-and-lobbying-expenditures-2/print/ 
(quoting the ALF-CIO counsel, who said that “Citizens United opened the floodgates for the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ALEC and super-PACs that serve as a direct threat to 
shareholder rights, economic growth and free enterprise”) [https://perma.cc/6SW9-XA33]; 
Kenneth P. Vogel, Court Decision Opens Floodgates for Corporate Cash, POLITICO (Jan. 21, 
2010, 10:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2010/01/court-decision-opens-floodgates-
for-corporate-cash-031786 [https://perma.cc/R4AA-6QKT]; see also Michael R. Siebecker, 
A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 
193–95 (2010). 
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would enable corporations to “marshal their power every day in 
Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.”16  In his 2010 
State of the Union address, President Obama added that the ruling would 
“open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations, to 
spend without limit in our elections.”17 
To the extent that Citizens United provided corporations with doctrinal 
rocket fuel, the more recent decision in McCutcheon v. FEC18 offered 
corporations a political jet pack.  In McCutcheon, after determining that 
spending large sums of money on elections did not corrupt the political 
process, the Court eliminated the prior cap19 on the total amount of 
spending by one individual (or corporation) on all federal candidates and 
political parties in an election cycle.20  Although the contribution limits per 
candidate and party committee remain in place,21 corporations may now 
give directly to as many political candidates and party organizations as 
desired.22  With the number of candidates and committees extant in the 
2016 election cycle, a corporation will therefore be able to increase its 
aggregate direct candidate and party contributions from $123,000 to 
$5,135,800.23  Working in tandem with the elimination of independent 
political spending limits in Citizens United, the removal of aggregate caps 
on direct candidate and political party spending in McCutcheon arms 
corporations with a much more powerful political arsenal than average 
citizens possess.24 
 
 16. Vogel, supra note 15; see also Siebecker, supra note 15, at 193–95. 
 17. Dan Eggen, Poll:  Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign 
Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html [https://perma.cc/N3ME-ZBZR]. 
 18. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 19. Prior to the rule, the limit per election cycle was approximately $123,000 per  
person. See LAWRENCE NORDEN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FIVE TO  
FOUR 9 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Five_to_Four_ 
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M55H-Y7D4]. 
 20. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1438 (“Spending large sums of money in connection 
with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an 
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption.  Nor does the 
possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner ‘influence over or access to’ 
elected officials or political parties.” (quoting Citizens United v. FEC 558 U.S. 310, 359 
(2010))). 
 21. See Marc E. Elias & Jonathan S. Berkon, After McCutcheon, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
373, 377 (2016) (“The impact of the McCutcheon holding itself is relatively straightforward.  
At the federal level, individuals may now donate the maximum amount to each candidate 
($2,600 per election), political committee ($5,000 per year), state party ($10,000 per year), 
and national party committee ($32,400 per year) without having to stay within aggregate 
limits.  The party committees are most likely to benefit from this change.”). 
 22. See NORDEN ET AL., supra note 19, at 10. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Elias & Berkon, supra note 21, at 374 (“Critics of the plurality view lament that it 
will further empower wealthy individuals and large corporations at the expense of average 
Americans.  There is some truth to that contention.  But under the current system, where 
contributions to political parties are strictly limited but contributions to so-called ‘Super 
PACs’ are not, wealthy individuals and large corporations already enjoy an outsized role.”). 
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Obviously emboldened by the Supreme Court’s rulings, corporations 
increasingly engage in massive amounts of political spending.25  
Corporations currently spend approximately $2.6 billion per year on 
political lobbying and “the biggest companies have upwards of 100 
lobbyists representing them, allowing them to be everywhere, all the 
time. . . .  Of the 100 organizations that spend the most on lobbying, 95 
consistently represent business.”26  A recent report by the Sunlight 
Foundation27 revealed that 200 of the most politically active for-profit 
corporations spent approximately $5.8 billion in lobbying and campaign 
contributions during the six-year period comprising the 2008, 2010, and 
2012 election cycles.28  In the 2014 election cycle alone, corporations spent 
over $1.1 billion just on state candidates and committees.29  Estimates for 
political advertising in the 2016 elections exceed $6 billion, with a vast 
majority of those funds coming from corporate coffers.30  For those who 
contend corporate involvement in politics sullies public discourse and 
perverts political outcomes,31 the increasingly dominant presence of 
 
 25. Bill Allison & Sarah Harkins, Fixed Fortunes:  Biggest Corporate Political Interests 
Spend Billions, Get Trillions, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 17, 2014, 9:26 AM), http:// 
sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/11/17/fixed-fortunes-biggest-corporate-political-interests-
spend-billions-get-trillions/ (“Between 2007 and 2012, 200 of America’s most politically 
active corporations spent a combined $5.8 billion on federal lobbying and campaign 
contributions.”) [https://perma.cc/G8QB-WLVS]; see also Michael Beckel, Top U.S. 
Corporations Funneled $173 Million to Political Nonprofits, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(Jan. 16, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/01/16/14107/top-us-
corporations-funneled-173-million-political-nonprofits (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission ruling in 2010 did not, as some warned, unleash a 
flood of corporate money directly into elections.  But since then, scores of blue-chip U.S. 
companies quietly bankrolled politically active nonprofits to the tune of at least $173 million 
in roughly a single year, according to a new Center for Public Integrity investigation.”) 
[https://perma.cc/784D-JM64]. 
 26. Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-
corporate-lobbyists-conquered-american-democracy/390822/ [https://perma.cc/4T2G-3S4J]. 
 27. According to its mission statement, “The Sunlight Foundation is a national, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that uses technology, open data, policy analysis and 
journalism to make our government and politics more accountable and transparent to all.” 
Our Mission, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://sunlightfoundation.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 14, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/N5GE-P7H4]. 
 28. See Allison & Harkins, supra note 25. 
 29. Bruce F. Freed & Marian Currinder, Do Political Business in the Daylight, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 6, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2016-
04-06/corporate-money-is-playing-a-shadowy-role-in-2016-politics [https://perma.cc/2ZDC-
E97T]. 
 30. Meg James, Political Ad Spending Estimated at $6 Billion in 2016, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-political-
ad-spending-6-billion-dollars-in-2016-20151117-story.html [https://perma.cc/C9L5-GD3E]. 
 31. See, e.g., Liz Kennedy, 10 Ways Citizens United Endangers Democracy, DEMOS 
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.demos.org/publication/10-ways-citizens-united-endangers-
democracy [https://perma.cc/6HML-WNG4]; Mimi Murray Digby Marziani, Money in 
Politics After Citizens United:  Troubling Trends & Possible Solutions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST. (Apr. 18, 2012), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/money-politics-after-citizens-
united-troubling-trends-possible-solutions [https://perma.cc/D8X6-EUL8]. 
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business interests in public elections risks a hostile corporate takeover of 
American politics.32 
2.  Clandestine Corporate Spending 
Perhaps animated by the hope of returns on political investment,33 yet 
fearful of potential harm to their reputations from disclosing unpopular 
political activity, many corporate executives find solace in secrecy.  
According to some estimates, during the 2012 presidential election over 
$300 million in political expenditures came from “dark money,”34 where 
the source of the funds remains clandestine as a result of various regulatory 
loopholes.35  Some estimate the amount of dark money in the 2016 election 
cycle will exceed $600 million.36  The New York Times asserts that as of 
May 2016, “two-thirds of political advertising dollars [in the 2016 election] 
have largely come from anonymous corporate donations, funneled through 
what have been referred to as ‘dark money’ nonprofit groups that freely 
engage in electoral and legislative politics, but don’t have to disclose their 
donors, expenditures or even their members.”37  While a recent study by the 
 
 32. Some suggest corporate political spending might actually enhance public discourse.  
See Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein’s Monster Hits the Campaign Trail:  An Approach to the 
Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 589–90 
(1991) (opposing prohibition of corporate political speech and emphasizing “the rationale 
that corporate political speech adds to the open marketplace of ideas protected by the first 
amendment”). 
 33. See Allison & Harkins, supra note 25. 
 34. Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), OPENSECRETS.ORG, https:// 
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) (“The 
term ‘dark money’ is applied to this category of political spender because these groups do 
not have to disclose the sources of their funding . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/2LGH-ACFH]. 
 35. Id. (noting that the amount of dark money “[p]artly as a result [of] spending by 
organizations that do not disclose their donors has increased from less than $5.2 million in 
2006 to well over $300 million in the 2012 presidential cycle and more than $174 million in 
the 2014 midterms”). 
 36. Albert R. Hunt, How Record Spending Will Affect 2016 Election, BLOOMBERG:  
VIEW (Apr. 26, 2015, 10:56 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-26/how-
record-spending-will-affect-2016-election (“There was $300 million in dark money spent in 
the last presidential race; there may be twice as much for 2016.  These donors often are 
looking for special favors or access, which wouldn’t be as easy to do if the spending were 
reported openly.”) [https://perma.cc/QN74-5YKX]; see also Michael Beckel, What Is 
Political “Dark Money”—And Is It Bad?, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 2, 2016, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/01/20/19156/what-political-dark-money-and-it-bad 
(“During the 2012 election cycle—the last time the presidency was at stake—dark money 
groups pumped about $300 million into political messages that called for the election or 
defeat of federal candidates, according to the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics.  
Additionally, dark money groups spent hundreds of millions of dollars on political 
advertisements that focused more on issues than candidates.”) [https://perma.cc/K4HY-
8Q5E]. 
 37. Kathleen M. Donovan-Maher & Steven L. Groopman, Why Dark Money Is Bad 
Business, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/opinion/why-
dark-money-is-bad-business.html [https://perma.cc/3T73-EW3F]; see also CTR. FOR 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY & ZICKLIN CTR. FOR BUS. ETHICS RESEARCH, THE 2015 CPA-
ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 9 (2015) 
[hereinafter 2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX], http://files.politicalaccountability.net/index/CPA-
Zicklin_Index_Final_with_links.pdf (“Despite popular concern, secret political spending 
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Center for Public Accountability found that 9 of the S&P 500 companies 
prohibit any kind of political spending, “there continues to be resistance to 
disclosing payments to (c)(4) nonprofit organizations that are permitted to 
conceal their donors.”38  Of course, the very nature of dark money, and the 
convoluted political loopholes through which such funds are disseminated, 
makes identifying the corporate source difficult to discern.  Regardless of 
that difficulty in detection, the point remains that to the extent corporations 
remain free to skulk about the political arena injecting dark money into 
campaigns under a cloak of anonymity, the electorate cannot effectively 
assess whether politicians remain in the pocket of corporate interests and 
shareholders cannot determine whether corporate managers use the 
corporate treasury to advance personal political interests.39 
Thus, even if participation by corporations in the political process might 
produce some public benefits rather than civic harms,40 the lack of 
transparency regarding corporate political activity presents a separate, 
especially significant problem for shareholders,41 consumers,42 and other 
 
continues to expand.  ‘Dark money,’ referring to political funding that cannot be tracked 
back to its first source, is expected to shatter prior records in the 2015–16 election cycle.”) 
[https://perma.cc/TZE8-EQ6E]. 
 38. 2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX, supra note 37, at 14. 
 39. See How Companies Spend, CTR. FOR POL. ACCOUNTABILITY, http://political 
accountability.net/political-spending-information/how-do-companies-spend (last visited Apr. 
14, 2017) (“Companies may also give unlimited sums to trade associations (called 501(c)(6) 
groups for their tax code classification) and ‘social welfare’ organizations (called 501(c)(4) 
groups).  These tax-exempt groups must have a ‘primary purpose’ other than elections.  
Unlike most political committees regulated by federal election law, they don’t have to 
disclose their donors.  Accordingly, corporate donors that wish to remain anonymous in their 
giving may find these organizations appealing.  The money these groups spend is often 
referred to as ‘dark money’ because the funding sources are unknown.  Much of this dark 
money shapes both the political agenda and the making of policy.  Its impact is seen on 
climate change, tax breaks, redistricting, and growing income equality.  ‘Such organizations 
have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on campaign activities in recent elections while 
declining to disclose their donors,’ noted Ken Doyle of BNA’s Money and Politics Report.  
The bottom line:  Dark money not only hurts our democracy; it also poses serious legal, 
reputational and business risks to companies.”) [https://perma.cc/Q9WR-N27G]. 
 40. See, e.g., Corporate Political Spending:  A Resource, CONF. BOARD, https:// 
www.conference-board.org/politicalspending/ (last updated Jan. 6, 2016) (“[C]orporate 
participation in the political process can be an important, and even essential, means of 
enhancing shareholder value, strengthening corporate reputation and goodwill, and engaging 
in good corporate citizenship.”) [https://perma.cc/SVV3-X86D]. 
 41. John Coates, SEC Non-Decision Decision on Corporate Political Activity a Policy 
and Political Mistake, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 13, 
2013, 8:51 AM), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/13/secs-non-decision-decision-on-
corporate-political-activity-a-policy-and-political-mistake/ (“Dozens of studies . . . support 
the view that political activity can harm shareholder interests.  These harms can flow through 
many channels—from reputational harm to dilution of strategic focus, from politically risky 
acquisition bets or capital investments to state laws deterring takeovers.  To adequately 
assess those risks, shareholders need basic, standardized information about political 
activity—before investing, and afterwards, to monitor corporate performance and make 
informed decisions.”) [https://perma.cc/85D5-QYER]; Lisa Gilbert, SEC Can Still Work on 
a Corporate Political Disclosure Rule, HILL (Dec. 22, 2015, 3:00 PM), http:// 
thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/264036-sec-can-still-work-on-a-corporate-political-
disclosure-rule (“The fact that corporate executives can spend company resources for 
political purposes without shareholders’ knowledge raises significant investor protection and 
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corporate constituencies.43  Essentially acknowledging the problems with 
secret political activity by corporations, Justice Kennedy revealed an 
appreciation for corporate transparency in his majority opinion in Citizens 
United: 
With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can 
provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold 
corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and 
supporters.  Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s 
political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and 
citizens can see whether elected officials are “in the pocket” of so-called 
moneyed interests.44 
Whether in the context of securities sales or proxy statements to solicit 
shareholder votes, transparency remains the primary tool employed by the 
securities laws to combat corporate fraud.45  But without effective 
transparency, “shareholders have no way to assess whether corporate 
political spending benefits them, and [have] every reason to believe it is 
fraught with risks to the corporate brand, business reputation, the bottom 
line and, by extension, shareholder returns.”46 
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s hope for corporate transparency and 
numerous concerted efforts to require corporations to disclose their political 
spending,47 corporations currently face no such requirement under federal 
 
corporate governance concerns.  Investors should not be left in the dark as to whether 
executives are spending funds on political causes that may run counter to shareholders’ 
interests.”) [https://perma.cc/EP6N-9JLF]. 
 42. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 43. See IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ELECTION SPENDING 2014:  
OUTSIDE SPENDING IN SENATE RACES SINCE CITIZENS UNITED 15–17 (2015), https:// 
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Outside%20Spending%20Since%20Citiz
ens%20United.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU43-RFM9]. 
 44. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93, 128 (2003)). 
 45. Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency:  Promoting Efficient Corporate 
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 117–18 (2009); 
see also What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 
10, 2013) (“Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate 
information can people make sound investment decisions.  The result of this information 
flow is a far more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital 
formation so important to our nation’s economy.”) [https://perma.cc/ZDR2-T4N4]. 
 46. See Editorial, Keeping Shareholders in the Dark, supra note 7. 
 47. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on 
Corporate Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013); Michael D. Guttentag, On 
Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593; 
Rebecca Ballhaus, Former SEC Officials Want Disclosure of Corporate Political 
Donations, WALL ST. J.:  WASH. WIRE (May 28, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
washwire/2015/05/28/former-sec-officials-want-disclosure-of-corporate-political-donations/ 
[https://perma.cc/CLH8-UPF7]; see also Will Ardinger, Firms Should Disclose Political 
Donations, CFA Says, CQ ROLL CALL, Sept. 5, 2014, 2014 WL 4377996 (discussing national 
accounting organization calls for political disclosure rule); Peter Feltman, SEC Faces Calls 
to Boost Political Spending Disclosure, CQ ROLL CALL, Apr. 25, 2015, 2015 WL 1652881 
(regarding interest group pressure); Alexandra Higgins, Congressional Democrats Urge SEC 
to Adopt Political Disclosure Rules, CQ ROLL CALL, Jan. 14, 2014, 2014 WL 128193 
(regarding pressure from Congress for SEC disclosure rule); Sean McElwee & Liz Kennedy, 
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or state law.48  To the contrary, current election law and securities 
regulations permit corporations to engage in undisclosed political spending 
in a variety of ways.49  As Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson 
detailed in their seminal article “Shining Light on Corporate Political 
Spending,” “public companies can, and do, engage in political spending that 
is never disclosed by channeling that spending through intermediaries.”50  
Even when some corporate spending is disclosed at the federal level—for 
instance when the Federal Election Commission reports donors who make 
direct contributions to particular candidates—the corporation itself does not 
need to disclose direct political spending to shareholders.51  Although 
academics,52 investors,53 market professionals,54 regulators,55 politicians,56 
 
The SEC Should Shine a Light on Dark Political Donations from Corporations, WEEK 
(July 24, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/445073/sec-should-shine-light-dark-political-
donations-from-corporations [https://perma.cc/C34K-DGYH]; Pamela Park, Former SEC 
Leaders Push for Political Disclosure Rulemaking, WESTLAW CORP. GOVERNANCE DAILY 
BRIEFING, 2015 WL 3403248 (mentioning a petition signed by 1.2 million people urging the 
SEC to adopt a disclosure rule). But see Paul Atkins, Materiality:  A Bedrock Principle 
Protecting Legitimate Shareholder Interests Against Disguised Political Agendas, 3 HARV. 
BUS. L. REV. 363 (2013); Matthew Lepore, A Case for the Status Quo:  Voluntary 
Disclosure, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 413 (2013); J.W. Verret, The Securities Exchange Act Is a 
Material Girl, Living in a Material World:  A Response to Bebchuk and Jackson’s “Shining 
Light on Corporate Political Spending,” 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 453 (2013); Eric 
Hammesfahr, House Bill Protects Corporate Political Donations, CQ ROLL CALL, June 10, 
2015, 2015 WL 3606637; Sean Parnell, Attacks on Political Donors Demonstrate Dangers 
of Excessive Disclosure, CTR. FOR COMPETITIVE POL. (July 28, 2011), http:// 
www.campaignfreedom.org/2011/07/28/attacks-on-political-donors-demonstrate-dangers-of-
excessive-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/9JVY-HHJG]. 
 48. See Steven Zuckerman, Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending:  Problematic or 
Pragmatic?, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 89, 89 (2014). 
 49. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 47, at 930–38. 
 50. Id. at 930; see also Gilbert, supra note 41 (“Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling, corporate political spending has 
exploded—and much of it has been channeled through dark money conduits like nonprofits 
and trade associations.”). 
 51. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 47, at 935 (“Existing election-law rules, such as 
regulations promulgated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), may require that 
information about this type of corporate political spending be available in the public domain.  
These rules, however, are designed to provide the public with information about the funding 
sources for particular politicians—not to allow investors to assess whether public companies 
are using shareholder money to advance political causes.”). 
 52. See Amy Biegelsen, Law Professors Ask SEC to Write New Political Donation 
Disclosure Rules for Business, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/08/05/5583/law-professors-ask-sec-write-new-
political-donation-disclosure-rules-business [https://perma.cc/XV9P-YKC7]. 
 53. See Tim Devaney, Investors Urge Corporate Political Spending Disclosure, HILL 
(May 20, 2015, 11:37 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/business/242655-investors-push-
sec-to-disclose-dark-money-in-politics [https://perma.cc/2H3U-6YKQ]. 
 54. See Ardinger, supra note 47 (describing the national accounting organization’s 
support). 
 55. Park, supra note 47 (regarding three former SEC leaders who urge adopting a 
political disclosure rule). 
 56. See Andrew Ackerman, Senate Democrats Renew Push for Corporate Disclosure of 
Political Spending, WALL ST. J.:  WASH. WIRE (Jan. 21, 2016, 5:35 PM), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/01/21/senate-democrats-renew-push-for-corporate-disclosure-
of-political-spending/ [https://perma.cc/7MMF-NVST]. 
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interest groups,57 and regular citizens58 have pressed the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt a mandatory disclosure rule for 
corporations, the SEC has resisted59 and only recently asked for 
commentary on a potential new political disclosure rule.60  To thwart any 
progress the SEC might achieve, however, Congress passed an 
appropriations bill in 2015 explicitly prohibiting the SEC from using funds 
to “finalize, issue, or implement” a corporate political disclosure rule during 
the upcoming year.61  In the absence of greater transparency regarding 
corporate political activity, disdain from a variety of corporate and 
stakeholder constituencies continues to grow. 
B.  Political Antitakeover Defenses and Failures 
Despite a host of regulatory and grassroots efforts to require disclosure of 
corporate political spending, corporations remain largely free to keep their 
political activities closeted from public view.  Nonetheless, the ardor with 
which investors, consumers, and other corporate stakeholders clamor for 
greater transparency makes the popular support for a corporate political 
disclosure rule seem incredibly strong and the failure to implement that will 
particularly problematic. 
 
 57. See Ben Goad, New Push for Disclosures on Corporate Giving, HILL (Sept. 4, 2014, 
7:02 AM), http://thehill.com/regulation/finance/216736-new-push-for-corporate-giving-
disclosure [https://perma.cc/NX7V-WRAA]. 
 58. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Hindering the SEC from Shining a 
Light on Political Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
12/22/business/dealbook/hindering-the-sec-from-shining-a-light-on-political-spending.html 
(describing over 1.2 million comments received by the SEC regarding a proposed political 
disclosure rule) [https://perma.cc/3VSM-D82Y]. 
 59. Zach Carter, Congress Is About to Make Citizens United Even Worse, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 16, 2015, 11:17 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sec-disclosure-
political-spending_us_56717f55e4b0648fe301a84c (“‘[SEC Chairman] Mary Jo White has 
spent more than two years alternatively throwing shade at political disclosure rules and 
actively hindering their completion,’ said Jeff Hauser, who runs the Revolving Door Project 
at the Center for Effective Government.  ‘Mary Jo White gave Congressional Republicans an 
opportunity to give corporate America a free pass to buy elections and public policy 
discreetly.’”) [https://perma.cc/83T4-T8L9]; Sarah Schweppe, How Are Big Businesses 
Buying U.S. Elections?, CHEAT SHEET (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.cheatsheet.com/ 
politics/how-is-big-business-buying-u-s-elections.html (“At a recent congressional hearing, 
SEC Chair Mary Jo White responded to a legislator who asked why the SEC had not made 
disclosing this kind of political spending a law with her usual rhetoric that it’s not the most 
important issue to the commission, according to the New York Times.  According to 
Reuters, in the past, she has said she opposes writing rules to exert ‘societal pressures on 
companies.’”) [https://perma.cc/86KX-M4QY]; see also Matthew Garza, SEC Rulemaking:  
Light at the End of the Mandated Tunnels, in 2015 YEAR IN REVIEW:  TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW 1, 3–4 (Wolters Kluwer ed., 2016). 
 60. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Securities Act 
Release No. 10064, Exchange Act Release No. 77599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 (Apr. 22, 2016). 
 61. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-13, § 707, 129 Stat. 
2242, 2273–74.  The bill includes a ban on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issuing 
disclosure rules affecting 501(c)(4) nonprofit groups. See id. 
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1.  Shareholder Activism 
Because a corporation’s political activity remains a material 
consideration to many investors in making their purchasing decisions,62 
shareholders get particularly piqued when corporations keep their political 
activity closeted.63  In light of the fundamental duty of loyalty that 
corporate managers owe to shareholders, disclosure of political 
contributions represents an essential mechanism to ensure board 
accountability.64  Investors remain concerned that corporate assets are being 
used to advance the personal interests of corporate managers rather than the 
interests of shareholders.65  Perhaps as a result, in the last proxy season, the 
most common shareholder proposals targeted corporate lobbying and 
political spending.66  Especially in light of recent academic studies 
demonstrating that corporate political spending does not enhance 
shareholder wealth,67 shareholders demand that managers account for how 
 
 62. See Corporate Political Spending:  Shareholder Activity, CONF. BOARD 
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.conference-board.org/politicalspending/index.cfm?id=6256 
(“Shareholders continue to seek increased transparency with respect to a company’s political 
activities and the potential legal and reputational risks such activities may create.  
Additionally, shareholders want to ensure that decisions regarding corporate political activity 
have strong board oversight.  Therefore, shareholder proposals calling for corporate political 
spending transparency allow the shareholder to monitor and hold executives accountable and 
ensure that a nexus exists between the political activity and the shareholders’ interests.”) 
[https://perma.cc/K2HN-XJUA]. 
 63. See MARC GOLDSTEIN, INV’R RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH INST., DEFINING 
ENGAGEMENT:  AN UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS, 
DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES (2014), https://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ 
engagement-between-corporations-and-investors-at-all-time-high1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM 
3K-6FTM]; Robert Kelner et al., Responding to Corporate Political Disclosure Initiatives:  
Guide for In-House Counsel, 23 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar.–Apr. 2015, 2015 WL 
5616354 (“A company that has received a political spending shareholder proposal also 
should consider initiating a dialogue with the shareholder regarding the proposal.  This 
would demonstrate that the company is focused on enhancing shareholder value and 
maintaining an open dialogue with shareholders.”). 
 64. Mara Lemos Stein & Maxwell Murphy, Investors Push for Fuller Picture of 
Corporate Political Contributions, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2016, 9:38 PM), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/investors-push-for-fuller-picture-of-corporate-political-contributions-
1459820285 (“Investors, however, are demanding a fuller picture of companies’ political 
giving and lobbying efforts. . . .  Investors aren’t necessarily looking to end corporate 
involvement in politics, but some of them want to make sure it is aligned with a company’s 
stated goals, and say disclosure will bolster accountability.”) [https://perma.cc/R3BT-
VR8H]; Skroupa, supra note 15; see also HEIDI WELSH & MICHAEL PASSOFF, PROXY 
PREVIEW, PROXY PREVIEW 2016:  HELPING SHAREHOLDERS VOTE THEIR VALUES 35–42 
(2016), www.proxypreview.org/Proxy-Preview-2016.pdf (describing the high number of 
shareholder proxy resolutions dedicated to disclosure of corporate political activity) 
[https://perma.cc/HU4K-UZ67]. 
 65. See Kwak, supra note 6; see also Coates, supra note 41. 
 66. See GIBSON DUNN, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 2015 
PROXY SEASON 1 (2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/Shareholder-
Proposal-Developments-During-the-2015-Proxy-Season.pdf (stating that the most common 
2015 shareholder proposal topics, along with the approximate number of proposals 
submitted were political and lobbying activities (110 proposals), proxy access (108 
proposals), and independent chair (76 proposals)) [https://perma.cc/SCK8-2YJN]. 
 67. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 5, at 658; Michael Hadani, Comment Letter on Petition 
to Require Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources 
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political spending promotes stated corporate values and business goals.68  
Moreover, when corporations engage in unwanted or indefensible political 
activity, shareholder hackles quickly get raised.69  For instance, CVS was 
accused of proxy fraud by one of its largest institutional investors based on 
a purported gross incongruity between the company’s publicly espoused 
values in its proxy statement and the company’s political expenditures.70  
To take another example, a coalition of investors recently demanded the 
resignation of two board members of WellPoint, a health insurance 
company, for its funding of “Stand Your Ground” legislation.71  As one 
prominent investor advocate commented, “Not only is this a reputational 
risk but a financial calamity—imagine paying for the health costs from gun 
injuries and deaths.”72  When corporate politics fail to align with investor 
preferences, investors properly fault the board, and corporate profitability 
hangs precariously in the balance.73  Without adequate political disclosure 
of political activity, however, it remains impossible to hold corporate 
managers accountable for any transgressions of their fundamental fiduciary 
duties. 
Clandestine corporate political spending not only undermines board 
accountability but also threatens the quickly burgeoning market in socially 
responsible investing (SRI).74  Although the definition of SRI remains 
 
for Political Activities 2–3 (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-
8.pdf [https://perma.cc/CF7M-9NHV]. 
 68. See Mara Lemos Stein, Corporate Political Spending Becomes Compliance Issue, 
WALL ST. J.:  RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Mar. 3, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
riskandcompliance/2016/03/03/corporate-political-spending-becomes-compliance-issue/ 
(“‘What we are asking for in disclosure is that a company be upfront and explain why such 
spending is important’ for the company’s strategy, said Timothy Smith, director of 
environmental social and governance shareowner engagement at Walden Asset 
Management, a part of Boston Trust & Investment Management Co., which has 
approximately $2.7 billion of assets under management.”) [https://perma.cc/5EFC-MSJW]; 
see also Eduardo Porter, Corporations Open Up About Political Spending, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/business/corporations-open-up-about-
political-spending.html (quoting the New York State Comptroller, stating that 
“[s]hareholders need transparency in order to determine whether corporate political spending 
benefits the company’s long-term value”) [https://perma.cc/TTD8-XA3D]. 
 69. See Lemos Stein, supra note 68 (“‘Companies need to think strategically about these 
issues,’ said Zachary Parks, special counsel in Covington & Burling’s Washington D.C. 
office.  ‘Companies that ignore disclosure initiatives have been the target of shareholder 
resolutions, bad press and lawsuits.  But kitchen-sink disclosure isn’t risk free.’  In an email, 
Mr. Parks said that at times, disclosure also can lead to litigation or negative ‘name-and-
shame’ publicity.  Establishing disclosure processes can be expensive, so companies need to 
weigh their particular risks and ‘see around the corner as to where this process is going.’”). 
 70. Pamela Park, Shareholder Calls CVS Political Spending Incongruent with Values, 
WESTLAW CORP. GOVERNANCE DAILY BRIEFING, Apr. 3, 2015, 2015 WL 1487121. 
 71. Skroupa, supra note 15. 
 72. Id. (quoting AFL-CIO counsel Robert E. McGarrah). 
 73. Adam Skaggs, Brennan Center for Justice, Comment Letter on Petition to Require 
Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources for Political 
Activities (Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-20.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/TB4R-CFQL]. 
 74. See Jennifer Woods, Doing Well While Doing Good:  Socially Responsible 
Investing, CNBC (Sept. 24, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/24/doing-well-
while-doing-good-socially-responsible-investing.html [https://perma.cc/3NHP-GHTC]. 
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somewhat protean, the desire “to achieve long-term competitive financial 
returns together with positive societal impact”75 reflects a typical strategy.  
Regardless of the definitional imprecision, investors increasingly make their 
stock purchasing decisions based in part on a variety of social, 
environmental, governance, and political criteria.76  As of 2015, investment 
managers of assets valued at over $45 trillion have signed the United 
Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, an international compact 
whereby signatories pledge to screen investments based on various 
environmental, social, and governance issues.77  In the United States alone, 
the amount of assets under management employing SRI strategies increased 
76 percent from 2012 to 2014, representing over $6.5 trillion under 
professional management.78  Although the SEC has traditionally held the 
view that mandatory disclosure of social data (including corporate political 
spending) remains outside the bailiwick of appropriate rulemaking, the 
agency recently acknowledged that investors pay increasing attention to 
social data in determining whether to buy or sell a company’s stock.79  One 
recent study from BlackRock, the largest investment manager, with over 
$4.6 trillion in assets under management, concluded an inextricable link 
exists between social responsibility and financial performance: 
ESG [(environmental, social, and governance)] factors cannot be divorced 
from financial analysis.  We view a strong ESG record as a mark of 
operational and management excellence.  Companies that score high on 
ESG measures tend to quickly adapt to changing environmental and social 
trends, use resources efficiently, have engaged (and, therefore, 
 
 75. USSIF FOUND., REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING 
TRENDS 2014, at 12, http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EAT-X9ZF]. 
 76. Jeff Benjamin, Socially Responsible Investing Is Coming of Age, INVESTMENTNEWS 
(Mar. 6, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160306/FREE/16030 
9960/socially-responsible-investing-is-coming-of-age [https://perma.cc/G8K7-NENU]. 
 77. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, IMPACT:  TRANSFORMING BUSINESS, CHANGING 
THE WORLD 40 (2015), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/publications/ImpactUN 
GlobalCompact2015.pdf (“The PRI is a global network of investors working together to put 
six principles for responsible investment into practice . . . .  The PRI commits signatories to 
incorporate environmental, social and governance issues into investment decision-making 
and ownership practices.  It has 1,325 signatories representing 45 trillion USD assets under 
management.”) [https://perma.cc/MSP4-YKJ9]. 
 78. USSIF FOUND., supra note 75, at 12. 
 79. See Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Securities Act 
Release No. 10064, Exchange Act Release No. 77599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 (Apr. 22, 2016) 
(“[T]he Commission has recognized that the task of identifying what information is material 
to an investment and voting decision is a continuing one in the field of securities regulation.  
The role of sustainability and public policy information in investors’ voting and investment 
decisions may be evolving as some investors are increasingly engaging on certain ESG 
[(environmental, social, or governance)] matters.  According to one study, investors are more 
likely to engage registrants on sustainability issues than on financial results or transactions 
and corporate strategy.  One observer expressed the view that ESG is not only a public 
policy issue but also a financial issue, noting a positive correlation between a ‘strong ESG 
record’ and excellence in operations and management.”). 
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productive) employees, and face lower risks of regulatory fines or 
reputational damage.80 
To the extent investors deem corporate political activity material to a 
decision to purchase or sell a company’s stock, disclosure of political 
spending seems necessary to provide adequate information to the public. 
The lack of transparency in corporate political activity presents a 
significant threat to the basic viability of the market for SRI.81  In an 
efficient market, investors should reward companies that embrace desired 
socially responsible business practices by paying a premium in stock price 
or offering cheaper access to capital.82  To the extent the premium exceeds 
the cost of compliance, both corporations and the SRI community gain.83  
Sustaining the market for SRI necessarily requires transparency in corporate 
practices and communications,84 for it would be wholly irrational for 
investors to pay a premium for stock in purportedly socially responsible 
companies if corporations conceal their actual business practices or actively 
dissemble.85  Thus, regardless of the incentives for invisibility corporations 
might perceive, permitting corporations to conceal political activities that 
investors deem material to their purchasing decisions threatens the viability 
of the $45 trillion market for corporate social responsibility86 and 
ineluctably undermines the efficient operation of the capital markets.87 
2.  Consumer and Community Retaliation 
In addition to shareholders, consumers and other stakeholders take 
seriously a corporation’s political spending and activities.  When Target 
faced a consumer boycott by nearly a quarter million consumers following 
the company’s $150,000 contribution to MN Forward, a group supporting a 
gubernatorial candidate opposed to same-sex marriage,88 Target quickly 
 
 80. BLACKROCK INV. INST., THE PRICE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2015), https:// 
www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/whitepaper/bii-pricing-climate-risk-us.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KWD4-E3CY]. 
 81. See Siebecker, supra note 15, at 185–89; see also Alex Edmans & David J. Vogel, 
Does Socially Responsible Investing Make Financial Sense?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2016, 
10:18 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/does-socially-responsible-investing-make-financial-
sense-1456715888 (“For many investors, socially responsible investing is now a guiding 
principle.  The number of mutual funds and exchange-traded funds catering to those 
investors has mushroomed in recent years, with industry heavyweights BlackRock Inc. and 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. prominent among those launching funds last year.”) 
[https://perma.cc/TXL6-C9NB]. 
 82. See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters:  Linking Corporate Efficiency 
and Political Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 106 
(2014). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Siebecker, supra note 45, at 117–18. 
 85. See generally James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on Political Spending, 18 
N.C. BANKING INST. 251 (2013) (arguing that investors should file shareholder derivative 
suits to challenge political spending allegedly harmful to the corporation). 
 86. See UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 77, at 40. 
 87. See Siebecker, supra note 45, at 117–18. 
 88. Bruce Watson, Target Boycott Expands Amid Confusion About Protest Goals, AOL 
(Aug. 6, 2010, 7:16 PM), https://www.aol.com/article/2010/08/06/target-boycott-expands-
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apologized to placate disgruntled consumers.89  Perhaps proving that no 
good deed goes unpunished, four years later when Target filed briefs 
supporting same-sex marriage in various court cases, the company faced a 
boycott from consumers on the opposite end of the political spectrum.90  Of 
course, Target is not the only company to face threats to profitability due to 
unwanted corporate activity.91  A 2010 Harris poll revealed that almost half 
of those surveyed would not purchase products or services from a business 
that contributed to a political candidate or cause they opposed.92  More 
generally, a 2013 study of American consumers revealed that 42 percent 
had boycotted in the past year a company’s products or services based on 
corporate misconduct and that 88 percent of consumers suggested they 
would boycott a company’s products if they learned the company had 
engaged in irresponsible or deceptive behavior.93 
Although directors and officers owe no fiduciary duties to 
nonshareholders, corporate managers cannot rationally fulfill their fiduciary 
duties without taking into account the effects business decisions might have 
on consumers and other corporate constituencies (e.g., employees, 
suppliers, and members of the community in which a corporation operates) 
whose reactions to instances of corporate political activity might threaten 
profitability.94  Perhaps as a result, some corporations have embraced 
voluntary disclosure protocols for corporate political spending.95  A 2015 
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joint study by the Center for Political Accountability and the Wharton 
School of Business found that 126 companies in the S&P 50096 have 
adopted some meaningful political activity disclosure and accountability 
policies,97 including 9 companies that impose outright bans on engaging in 
any sort of political spending.98  The driving force for that that transparency 
(and bans on corporate spending for a very few companies) is effective risk 
management, whether through diminished threat of litigation, consumer ire, 
or investor agitation.99  Engaging consumers and other stakeholders through 
effective discourse prior to pursuing any particular political activity can 
work to prevent deleterious market effects from corporate managers who 
blithely advance unpopular political commitments.100 
Even as more companies embrace the benefits of voluntary transparency, 
however, a mandatory disclosure rule remains necessary to eradicate the 
perverse incentives for corporations to pursue duplicitous branding.  The 
basic concern lies in the ability of corporations to curry consumer favor for 
some purported values without actually embracing those commitments.  
The Volkswagen defeat device scandal provides a helpful example.101  
Although Volkswagen purported to market “clean diesel” automobiles that 
appealed to consumers concerned about the environment,102 Volkswagen 
installed a carbon-detection cheating device in eleven million of its 
vehicles.103  With those defeat devices in place, the company could conceal 
that its purportedly environmentally friendly vehicles emitted far more 
pollution than claimed.104  When this cheating device was eventually 
discovered, Volkswagen suffered greatly for its dissembling,105 with some 
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current estimates of total liability for the company exceeding $35 billion.106  
Some might argue that the punishment Volkswagen continues to endure 
reflects proper functioning of market forces.  When the fraud was 
discovered, consumers, investors, regulators, and law enforcement officials 
responded with swift rebuke.107  But that insight misses the basic point that 
it is the very ability to detect the fraud—even if only after elaborate 
study108 in the case of the Volkswagen cheat device—that allows market 
forces to work at all. 
In the context of corporate dark money, the inability to detect the source 
of the contributions makes it extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for 
the market to detect when corporations behave in a way wholly inconsistent 
with their purported values.109  That inability to verify the cohesion 
between the projected brand image and actual corporate action provides 
companies with a perverse incentive to play both sides of the fence.  For 
instance, when North Carolina passed House Bill 2, prohibiting transgender 
individuals from using a bathroom designated for the gender other than 
found on their birth certificate,110 thirty-six corporate executives from S&P 
500 companies spoke out against the measure as contrary their 
corporation’s core values.111  Yet according to the Center for Political 
Accountability, those same corporations contributed heavily to a powerful 
political committee that helped elect the very same legislature responsible 
for the transgender bathroom law.112  Although that example marks an 
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instance of corporate hypocrisy that eventually came to light, not all 
corporate political contributions remain traceable or subject to public 
reporting.113  As a result, corporations face an incentive to project political 
images that appeal to consumers while taking wholly contrary political 
actions, perhaps simply to advance the personal interest of corporate 
managers.114  That incentive only exists, however, if corporate political 
spending remains secret.  Shedding light on corporate political activity 
would prevent corporations from engaging in false political branding by 
allowing the market to punish hypocrisy wherever it arises. 
3.  Democratic Discontent 
Clandestine corporate political spending flies in the face of popular will 
and signals a corruption of politics that is well underway.  A September 
2015 Bloomberg poll revealed that 80 percent of Republicans and 83 
percent of Democrats believe Citizens United should be overturned.115  
Although the Supreme Court remains insulated from popular opinion, the 
poll reflects widespread discontent with the ability of corporations to 
dominate the political process.  Along those lines, a 2015 Public Policy 
Polling survey of primary voters reported that 88 percent of Democrats as 
well as 88 percent of Republicans want the SEC to promulgate a rule 
requiring corporations to disclose their political spending.116  Despite the 
concerted efforts of academics, advocacy groups, nonprofit organizations, 
and ordinary citizens,117 the SEC has to date resisted issuing a disclosure 
rule targeting corporate political spending.118  And even if the SEC were 
otherwise inclined, Congress included a provision in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act prohibiting the SEC from promulgating any disclosure 
requirement on corporate political activities in 2016.119  What seems so 
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odd—if not overtly suspicious—is that despite widespread popular 
discontent with corporate involvement in the political process and 
enormous support for imposing on corporations a disclosure obligation 
regarding their political activities, elected officials seem dedicated to 
protecting corporate secrecy.  Such gross incongruity between clearly 
expressed popular will and the actions of our elected representatives over 
the issue of corporate transparency suggests our political processes might 
already suffer corporate corruption at the core.  At the very least, corporate 
influences seem to have muted millions of voices screaming to be heard. 
As some of the most important decisions affecting our daily lives get 
made behind boardroom doors rather than in the public sphere, secret 
political spending exacerbates the problem of ignoring popular will by 
turning notions of robust democratic accountability into a delusional 
dream.120  The largest 100 public companies in the world have a combined 
market capitalization in excess of $16 trillion,121 with 53 of those 
companies located in the United States.122  The economic power under the 
control of just those fifty-three domestic companies trumps the economic 
influence of many nation-states.123  With that great economic might, giant 
corporations have supplanted traditional governmental institutions in 
providing some of the most important rulemaking, adjudicative, and 
security functions.124  Moreover, with the advent of the corporate social 
responsibility movement and the need to develop new markets to expand 
productivity,125 corporations have also become more deeply engaged in 
shaping public mores and social attitudes as well.126  Because corporations 
take such a proactive role in molding our collective identities, “[c]orporate 
internal governance issues, once considered strictly economic and confined 
to internal corporate stakeholders, have been broadened to include social 
and political issues and the concerns of outside stakeholders beyond the 
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regulatory authority of the chartering state.”127  Quite simply, democratic 
legitimacy of our polity remains inextricably linked to the legitimacy of 
corporate governance mechanisms.  Without adequate transparency, we 
cannot begin to hold corporations accountable in any of the economic, 
social, and political realms they increasingly dominate.  Thus, especially in 
light of the enormous influence of corporations in all aspects of our daily 
lives, if corporations remain capable of operating in the shadows, the 
bedrock principle of democratic accountability becomes severely 
jeopardized.128 
In addition to threatening important notions of democratic and political 
accountability, clandestine corporate spending undermines effective 
discourse.  In Doe v. Reed,129 a case in which the Supreme Court denied the 
claim of political petition signatories to remain anonymous, Justice Antonin 
Scalia noted: 
Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic 
courage, without which democracy is doomed.  For my part, I do not look 
forward to a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns 
anonymously[,] . . . hidden from public scrutiny and protected from the 
accountability of criticism.  This does not resemble the Home of the 
Brave.130 
Although the Supreme Court has protected the right to anonymous political 
speech in certain circumstances, the justifications for anonymity typically 
center on the speaker’s fear of repression, retribution, or harassment.131  No 
such concerns would seem plausible for the increasingly powerful modern 
corporation.  Although in Citizens United the Supreme Court rejected the 
notion that the extreme wealth of corporations necessarily corrupts the 
political process, transparency provided the essential justification for 
unfettered corporate spending.132  Quite simply, we cannot trust the 
motivations of corporations engaging in political discourse without 
transparency.  In an organizational structure governed by fiduciary duties, 
trust and transparency go hand in hand.133  Moreover, without knowing the 
identity of the corporate speaker, we cannot engage in the meaningful 
dialectic discourse necessary to sustain the trust that arguably provides the 
sole motivation for corporations to engage in political speech on 
shareholders’ behalf. 
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Thus, with the growing dominance of corporations in the political sphere, 
the lack of adequate transparency regarding corporate political activity 
necessary to satisfy investors and consumers, and inherent suspicions about 
the motives of corporate executives in using corporate treasuries to advance 
their personal political preferences, a robust political spending disclosure 
rule seems essential to ensure the integrity of the capital markets and the 
legitimacy of democratic processes.  Congress, state governments, and 
federal agencies, however, have failed to articulate a coherent disclosure 
rule and corporations have not sufficiently embraced disclosure voluntarily.  
Nonetheless, existing disclosure principles embedded within insider trading 
law could offer a solution.  Just as the basic fiduciary principles of trust that 
animate insider trading doctrine require corporate insiders either to disclose 
to the market material nonpublic information prior to trading or abstain 
from trading altogether, those same basic fiduciary principles could require 
corporate managers to disclose to the market material political spending or 
abstain from political activity altogether.  At its root, the fiduciary duty of 
trust binding officers and directors to the company and its shareholders 
remains the same regardless of whether the context of its application is 
insider trading or some other area of corporate governance.  The only 
question is whether the disclosure obligation that the Supreme Court 
recognized as an essential component of the fiduciary duty of trust in the 
context of insider trading would apply equally well to the context of 
political spending. 
II.  THE FIDUCIARY FRAMEWORK OF INSIDER TRADING 
Understanding whether the disclosure obligation embedded in the 
Supreme Court’s insider trading doctrine should similarly compel 
corporations to disclose their political spending requires a brief explication 
of the evolution of the basic fiduciary framework for insider trading 
prohibitions.  Of course, this examination does not delve deeply into every 
facet of insider trading because the point is simply to ascertain how 
transferrable the basic disclosure obligation within the insider trading 
context might be to instances of corporate political spending. 
A.  Foundations of the Disclosure Obligation 
Although insider trading prohibitions rest upon the statutory foundation 
of federal securities laws,134 the Supreme Court specifies the content of 
insider trading doctrine based on basic common law fiduciary principles 
governing the actions of corporate managers.135  The omnibus securities 
fraud prohibitions contained in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934136 and the corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5137 nonetheless provide 
the jurisprudential springboard for the development of insider trading 
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principles.  Those provisions, which grew out of the concern for 
maintaining the integrity of the capital markets after the stock market crash 
of 1929,138 generally prohibit the use of fraudulent or deceptive practices in 
the context of buying or selling securities.139 
What constitutes a fraudulent or deceptive practice does not appear in the 
statute or Rule 10b-5.  Instead, courts look to common law principles of 
fraud and deceit to define actionable behavior.140  Under those traditional 
common law principles, silence typically does not provide a cause of action 
for deceit.141  But in the insider trading context, the Supreme Court has 
articulated a special disclosure obligation based on the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship, either between corporate insiders and company 
shareholders or between traders and the source of material nonpublic 
information.142  For instance, the Supreme Court requires that to avoid 
liability for improper insider trading, a corporate insider who possesses 
material nonpublic information must disclose that information or abstain 
from trading altogether.143  The special obligation contained in the 
“disclose or abstain” rule stems from the fundamental notion that corporate 
insiders cannot use property belonging to the corporation (i.e., information) 
to deceive or gain an advantage over those to whom a fiduciary duty of trust 
is owed.144  It is precisely because silence would constitute a breach of a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty that the Supreme Court imposes upon insiders a 
special disclosure duty prior to trading. 
The Supreme Court currently recognizes two primary theories of insider 
trading liability—the classical insider theory and the misappropriation 
theory.  Under each theory, actionable insider trading occurs when an 
individual trades (or tips others to trade)145 based on material nonpublic 
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information in violation of a fiduciary duty.146  The essential jurisprudential 
predicate of a fiduciary breach, however, must exist in order for an 
individual to suffer liability for illicit insider trading under both the classical 
and misappropriation theories.  A better understanding of how disclosure 
relates to those fiduciary duties provides a possible bridge for applying that 
same “disclose or abstain” rule in the context of corporate political 
spending. 
B.  Classical Insider Theory 
First, the classical theory of insider trading targets a breach of an explicit 
fiduciary relationship between a corporate insider and the shareholders.147  
In the first case to explicate the theory, Chiarella v. United States,148 the 
Supreme Court reversed an insider trading conviction of an employee of a 
financial printing firm who traded in the stock of future acquisition targets 
of the firm’s clients.149  In vacating the conviction, the Supreme Court 
tethered the general “disclose or abstain” obligation to the existence of a 
“fiduciary or other similar relation of trust or confidence” with the parties 
on the other side of the transaction.150  Because Chiarella was not an 
officer, director, or employee of the acquisition target companies, he 
therefore had no fiduciary obligation to the target companies’ shareholders.  
As a result, no duty to disclose arose regarding the material nonpublic 
information he possessed about the impending takeovers and no fraud 
occurred through his silence prior to trading.151 
The classical theory thus embraces a fiduciary breach rationale for what 
triggers a duty to disclose.  Although previously, lower courts and the SEC 
advanced an “access to equal information” principle as the guiding light for 
prohibiting insiders from taking advantage of special access to material 
information,152 the Supreme Court formally rejected that rationale.153  What 
continues to remain the paramount consideration in establishing illicit 
insider trading under the classical theory is whether a fiduciary breach 
occurred.154  And for classical insiders, it is serving as a director, officer, or 
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employee of the corporation in which the securities are traded155 that 
provides the fiduciary obligation to refrain from using the corporation’s 
information for personal gain.156 
C.  Misappropriation Theory 
The second basic theory of insider trading—the misappropriation 
theory—similarly requires the existence of a fiduciary breach for illicit 
insider trading to occur.157  In the misappropriation context, however, the 
fiduciary breach does not arise in the context of a relationship with the 
company in which the securities are traded.158  Instead, the fiduciary duty 
arises out of a relationship of trust or confidence with the source of the 
information.159  In United States v. O’Hagan,160 the Supreme Court upheld 
an insider trading conviction of a law firm partner who used material 
nonpublic information about a client’s intended acquisition of another 
company to trade in the target company’s stock.  Although O’Hagan had no 
duty to the target company, as a partner in the firm he had a fiduciary duty 
to the firm and its clients.161  By failing to disclose to his firm and client 
that he intended to trade, he breached an essential fiduciary duty of trust and 
confidence to the source of the information.162 
In contrast to the classical theory’s focus on the fiduciary relationship 
between the corporate insider and company shareholders, the 
misappropriation theory examines the fiduciary requirements of the 
relationship between the trader and the source of information.163  Therefore, 
under the misappropriation theory, gaining immunity from insider trading 
liability does not require disclosure of material secret information to the 
public prior to trading.164  As the Court explained: 
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Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves 
feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to 
the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 
“deceptive device” and thus no § 10(b) violation—although the fiduciary-
turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of 
loyalty.165 
Thus, the nature of the fiduciary duty at stake defines the ambit of the 
disclosure necessary to avoid liability. 
The misappropriation theory extends rather than supplants the classical 
insider theory for illicit trading.  A classical insider who trades based on 
material nonpublic information clearly violates a fiduciary duty of trust to 
the shareholders of the corporation in which the securities are traded.  But 
that insider also misappropriates the information based on a breach of the 
same fiduciary duty owed to shareholders.166  The misappropriation theory 
captures individuals who have no relationship with the company in which 
securities are traded but who nonetheless breach a similar fiduciary duty of 
trust by using the information for personal gain. 
Regardless of the theory of insider trading considered, the breach of 
fiduciary duty of trust remains an essential predicate for liability.  The 
disclose or abstain rule applies in each context to prevent the breach, 
although the scope of the audience for the disclosure to immunize a trader 
from liability changes depending upon the fiduciary relationship 
considered.  Nonetheless, disclosure remains the essential cleansing agent 
for otherwise deceitful trading activity. 
D.  The Malleable Materiality Threshold 
Insider trading liability can only arise when individuals trade on the basis 
of material nonpublic information.  According to the Supreme Court, 
information is material to the extent there is a “substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”167  For contingent events, a materiality determination also takes 
into account the probability that an event will occur against the magnitude 
of its potential effect.168 
Despite any appearance of mathematical precision, the materiality 
threshold remains somewhat malleable if not entirely vague.169  Many 
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academics170 and market professionals have criticized the lack of clarity in 
the materiality standard for insider trading, whether for inhibiting 
disclosure,171 providing perverse incentives to corporate managers to seek 
short-term gains,172 increasing corporate costs,173 or ignoring prevailing 
investor preferences.174  Some suggest that the purposeful vagueness of the 
materiality standard enables insiders to escape liability for illicit insider 
trading.175  Others suggest the ambiguity injects some prosecutorial bias 
and arbitrariness into enforcement.176  Irrespective of the deleterious 
repercussions of a loose definition, the controlling conception of materiality 
necessary to trigger insider trading liability remains quite capacious. 
Understanding the potential breadth of materiality in the insider trading 
context helps inform when a disclosure obligation might be triggered in the 
corporate political spending context.  To the extent it seems 
jurisprudentially reasonable to incorporate the disclose or abstain rule from 
insider trading into the fiduciary duty of loyalty implicated in corporate 
political spending, the reach of that disclosure obligation becomes more 
apparent.  If a reasonable investor might find political spending by the 
corporation relevant to a determination of whether to purchase or sell 
company stock, then disclosure of even small levels of political spending 
might require public airing. 
III.  PROHIBITING POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING 
In light of the increasing dominance of corporations in the political 
realm, the ability of corporations to secretly influence elections with dark 
money spending, and an almost deafening clamor for greater transparency 
regarding corporate political activity, the application of the disclose or 
abstain rule from insider trading to corporate political spending seems 
intellectually justifiable and practically necessary.  Making the case for that 
doctrinal transfer, however, requires a greater explication of the fiduciary 
duties implicated in corporate political spending, the materiality of political 
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spending to investor preferences, and the feasibility of a mandatory 
disclosure rule for corporate spending under existing corporate governance 
standards and the First Amendment. 
A.  Suspicious Agendas, Secret Spending, 
and the Business Judgment Rule 
Perhaps the main jurisprudential hurdle for justifying the adoption of a 
disclose or abstain rule for corporate political spending is establishing the 
similarity of the fiduciary obligations that apply in the context of insider 
trading with the fiduciary duties involved in corporate political spending.  
The essential question is whether the concerns in each doctrinal realm are 
sufficiently similar so that transferring common law duties from one 
context to the other does not seem odd.  Indeed, there are many instances in 
the common law when gaps in one doctrinal area look to another for 
guidance.177  In both the insider trading realm and in the context of 
corporate political spending, a potential breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty 
by directors and officers secretly using the company’s assets for personal 
gain provides a common thread.178  And in each case, disclosure of the 
potentially illicit activity remains a necessary step to ensure no breach of a 
fiduciary duty exists. 
But why doesn’t the business judgment rule simply control whether 
corporate managers comport with their fiduciary duties in making political 
contributions?179  When corporate managers face challenges to the wisdom 
of using the corporate treasury to engage in political activity, the broad 
umbrella of protection that the business judgment rule affords represents a 
great place to seek refuge.180  A common law doctrine recognized in every 
jurisdiction,181 the business judgment rule essentially insulates the business 
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decisions of directors and officers from reproach by courts, and from 
liability to shareholders, as long as those decisions were made in the 
absence of fraud, illegality, conflict of interest, or gross negligence.182  No 
doubt, corporate managers would assert that engaging in political activity—
whether through direct lobbying, participation in trade associations, issue 
advertising, or political contributions to committees, parties and 
candidates—simply represents one mundane aspect of business as usual.183  
Helping shape legislation and viewpoints in ways that increase profitability 
should not be considered any different than crafting an effective marketing 
campaign.184  As a result, the business judgment rule should insulate 
decisions about corporate political spending from attack, just as decisions in 
the ordinary course of business remain immune from reproach.  From the 
viewpoint of corporate managers, judges with no business acumen and 
nettlesome shareholders with fetish political interests should simply step 
aside and let business experts determine how best to pursue the interests of 
the company. 
Despite the obvious appeal to directors and officers of invoking the 
business judgment rule, application of the doctrine seems inapposite in the 
case of secret political spending.  As already discussed, a strong business 
case for political contributions does not exist.185  Therefore, even if 
corporate political spending were public, the wisdom of such expenditures 
would be difficult to establish.  Of course, corporate managers need not 
prove that any business decision maximizes shareholder wealth or enhances 
profits in the short term to garner the protection of the business judgment 
rule.186  Quite to the contrary, the very purpose of the business judgment 
rule is to afford adequate leeway to managers to take risks and direct 
corporate affairs without undue distraction.187  But a crucial caveat for 
protection is the absence of conflicts of interest infecting the managers’ 
decisions.188  When conflicts of interest arise, no presumption exists that 
managerial decisions comport with their fiduciary duties to the corporation 
and its shareholders. 
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Clandestine political spending, however, unavoidably raises the specter 
of a duty of loyalty breach.  Academics,189 journalists,190 politicians,191 and 
market professionals192 have sounded the alarm that secrecy makes it 
impossible to discern if corporate managers use company coffers to pursue 
personal interests (whether financial or moral) at the expense of shareholder 
wealth.  With increasing pressure on companies from the private and public 
sectors for greater transparency,193 and in light of the increasing number of 
companies voluntarily disclosing political spending policies and 
practices,194 the very decision to keep corporate spending closeted creates a 
reasonable suspicion that there is something illicit to hide. 
The potential retort that secrecy avoids potential investor and consumer 
backlash for unpopular political commitments rings hollow.  Although 
discontent from those groups certainly imposes significant costs, academic 
and professional literature195—along with current market practices196—
make clear that only through transparency about political activity can 
executives effectively manage the expected benefits against potential 
costs.197  If secrecy does not make business sense and the market continues 
to embrace greater transparency, then the impetus for keeping corporate 
political spending secret becomes necessarily and especially suspect.198  As 
a result of the inescapable questions regarding managerial motives in 
actively concealing corporate political activity, the conflict of interest 
exception to the business judgment rule should prevent officers and 
directors from escaping substantive review.199 
The kind of fiduciary infidelity that triggers the exception to the business 
judgment rule mirrors the potential duty of loyalty breach animating the 
disclose or abstain rule in the insider trading context.  Although some 
academic debate exists about the philosophical beginnings of a duty of 
loyalty breach in the insider trading context,200 the Supreme Court 
embraces the basic agency law principle that agents cannot use the 
principal’s property to earn secret profits.201  Whether in the classical 
insider or misappropriation context, the fiduciary infidelity lies in using 
proprietary information without prior disclosure.202  It might seem odd to 
think of the basic concern as focused on the secrecy of the profits rather 
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than on the profits themselves.203  Under basic agency principles, the agent 
would also need to disgorge any unauthorized profits to the principal as an 
additional fiduciary obligation.204  The secret use of property and profits 
derived from unauthorized use, however, mark two separate fiduciary 
breaches in the principal-agent relationship.  The loyalty breach targeted in 
the insider trading context remains the use of property (i.e., information) 
obtained through a relationship of trust without disclosure to the fiduciary 
partner.205  That is the precise fiduciary concern at stake in the context of 
corporate political spending, except that the property used is money rather 
than information.  The disclose or abstain rule incentivizes fidelity—at least 
to that basic obligation of transparency.  If a corporate manager used the 
corporate treasury to gain personal profits, agency law principles also 
require disgorgement to the principal.206  But it is the potential for the initial 
fiduciary misstep that should cause the disclose or abstain rule to adhere in 
instances of corporate political spending, just as it does in the insider 
trading realm. 
But why should secret political spending be treated any differently than 
managerial decisions to donate corporate funds to charities or to engage in 
socially responsible business practices?207  With respect to charitable 
donations and corporate social responsibility (CSR), no statutory or 
common law rule requires disclosing a corporation’s specific commitments.  
Instead, corporate executives remain free to direct corporate funds toward 
charitable ends or to embrace socially responsible behavior to promote the 
long-term interests of the corporation.  Arguably, those activities represent 
ordinary tactics in an overall corporate strategy to bolster a firm’s 
reputation and image. 
Secret political spending, however, does not resemble charitable giving 
or socially responsible behavior.  Despite the rhetoric of unity that many 
politicians embrace, the political process necessarily polarizes with 
identifiable winners and losers.  For many people, politics is the 
quintessential dirty zero-sum game208 with politicians and political causes 
competing for scarce resources and votes.209  In contrast, charitable activity 
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represents a public good,210 and as a society we provide incentives (in the 
form of tax deductions) for supporting charitable enterprises.211 
Embracing CSR does not reflect charitable behavior, especially if a 
market for CSR exists where consumers and investors are willing pay a 
premium in stock or product price to companies that embrace social 
responsibility.  But even conceived in those market terms, the advent and 
endurance of socially responsible business behavior results because all 
parties realize a win-win trade.212  No such societal Pareto improvement 
exists in the world of clandestine corporate political spending where 
concerns of managerial duplicity and secret agendas threaten to undermine 
shareholder wealth. 
Thus, affording unquestioning blanket protection under the business 
judgment rule to clandestine corporate political spending decisions would 
ignore the wholly reasonable suspicion that executives are using corporate 
assets without the knowledge of shareholders for personal gain.  The 
disclose or abstain rule in the insider trading context targets the very same 
potential fiduciary breach.  Applying that rule for transparency seems to be 
an essential first step before blithely accepting a presumption that directors 
and officers act in concert with their fiduciary duties. 
B.  The Materiality of Morality 
Although the fiduciary obligations at stake seem quite similar in the 
insider trading and corporate political contexts, imposing a disclose or 
abstain rule to corporate political spending would seem warranted only if 
the spending were material to investors.  Some scholars suggest that 
corporate political spending does not have a material effect on corporate 
profitability and thus should not be subject to disclosure.213  Others 
similarly suggest that if a company engages in corporate political activity 
that has a material effect on business, existing securities rules and 
regulations already require disclosure in standard corporate filings.214  For 
those antidisclosure proponents, forcing additional disclosure obligations on 
the corporation would only impose significant costs without any noticeable 
gains to shareholders.215  What the antidisclosure approach misses, and 
what the shift to a consideration of corporate political spending under 
insider trading principles illuminates, is that materiality remains tethered to 
the purchasing preferences of shareholders. 
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Without doubt, a corporation’s social and political viewpoints matter to 
investors.  As detailed above, in the United States alone, more than $6.5 
trillion is invested based on SRI strategies.216  The basic viability of the 
almost $45 trillion worldwide market for CSR rests on the ability of 
investors and consumers to ascertain and reward companies that embrace 
socially responsible practices.217  Large institutional investors, financial 
advisory firms, advocacy groups, nonprofit organizations, public policy 
centers, politicians, and even (reluctantly and only recently) the SEC 
acknowledge that investors seriously consider the environmental, social, 
and political commitments of a company prior to purchasing stock.218 
The additional concerns of consumers and other stakeholders make the 
materiality calculation even more certain.  To the extent consumers boycott 
company products or lose faith in a corporate brand due to unwanted 
corporate political activity, the profitability of the company is necessarily 
affected.  That connection between consumer behavior and the corporate 
bottom line would rationally cause shareholders who have no CSR bent to 
find corporate positions on social and political issues material to a decision 
to buy or sell company stock.219 
But how much political spending must occur to cross the materiality 
threshold?  Quite simply, any political spending would seem to suffice.  
The intensity of investor preferences regarding socially responsible data, 
including political spending, is not easily quantifiable and may swamp other 
criteria in determining whether to invest.  Consider how the Reform 
Pension Board (RPB), an institutional investor with $1.2 billion in assets 
focused on advancing Reform Jewish principles,220 would react to a 
company in which it invested disclosing a $1,000 contribution to a 
senatorial candidate who was a proud member of the Ku Klux Klan.  Would 
the RPB sell all of its shares?  That is exactly the pledge of the Timothy 
Plan, an investment fund dedicated to “biblically responsible investing.”221  
According to fund managers, “we spent countless hours investigating 
companies to determine if they were involved in any unbiblical practices.  
In 1994, we pioneered the first pro-life, pro-family screening standard.  Our 
commitment, first to our Lord, is that we will not invest a single penny into 
any company that violates our screens.”222  Faith-based funds remain a 
significant portion of the SRI community and political commitments of 
corporations remain core to their concerns.223  Of course, the existence of 
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intense faith-based investing preferences does not suggest that secular 
socially responsible funds respond any less emphatically to instances where 
corporations fail to live up to expectations.224  The point remains that 
because many SRI investors possess intense preferences for socially 
responsible behaviors that are not easily quantifiable, even small corporate 
contributions to political causes remain not just material but often fully 
determinative of investor decisions.  And since a company cannot control 
which investors constitute its pool of shareholders, the company’s political 
commitments may have a great impact on the volatility of its shares. 
Thus, despite the antidisclosure advocates’ focus on the cost to the 
corporation of additional disclosure obligations, corporate political 
spending seems to fall squarely within the standards for materiality 
established by the Supreme Court.225 
C.  Fidelity in the Light of Disclosure 
With the materiality of morality firmly established for the investing 
community, the next step involves an examination of the potential 
effectiveness of disclosure to prevent or expose a fiduciary breach in the 
context of corporate political spending.  In the realm of exercising corporate 
fiduciary duties, trust and transparency remain inextricably linked.226  In the 
case of insider trading, because the essential fiduciary breach results from 
the failure to disclose prior to using for personal gain information obtained 
in a relationship of confidence or trust, the disclose or abstain rule remains 
perfectly targeted at preventing a breach at the outset.  In the same way, the 
secrecy of corporate political spending provides the focus of a fiduciary 
breach because of the inherent risk that corporate managers are using 
corporate treasuries to advance their particular beliefs to the detriment of 
shareholders.  In both situations, a disclose or abstain rule remains the 
essential antiseptic for the fiduciary breach premised upon an agent’s secret 
use of the principal’s property (whether money or information) for personal 
gain. 
The disclose or abstain rule does not target the personal gain for which 
the agent uses the property.  As Justice Ginsburg noted in the majority 
opinion in O’Hagan regarding the breach of trust under the 
misappropriation theory, 
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Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves 
feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to 
the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no 
‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation—although the fiduciary-
turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of 
loyalty.227 
That secondary avenue for liability for using the principal’s property for 
personal gain targets separate agency principles that require the 
disgorgement of any profits.  The same is true in the classical insider 
trading context.  The breach that triggers liability is the failure to disclose to 
company shareholders (including all potential future shareholders in the 
market) material nonpublic information obtained from a relationship of trust 
and confidence with the corporation prior to trading.228  The fact that the 
insider earned profits based on trading is a secondary concern that attaches 
only to the amount of liability, whether under the umbrella of insider 
trading sanctions or under basic agency law theory requiring disgorgement. 
In a similar fashion to the manner in which the disclose or abstain rule 
attempts to ensure individuals do not breach their essential duty of trust by 
trading in securities without prior disclosure of their intent to their fiduciary 
counterpart—whether to the source of the material nonpublic information 
under the misappropriation theory or to the (potential) shareholders of the 
company in which the securities are traded under the classical theory—a 
disclose or abstain rule for political corporate spending would prevent 
executives from being able to “feign fidelity” to the corporation and its 
shareholders.  A rule that requires disclosure prior to using corporate 
information or assets provides a well-tailored mechanism to prevent 
corporate managers from breaching their fiduciary duties or at least exposes 
the breach to ensure appropriate liability. 
Another important concern regarding the cleansing capabilities of 
common law disclosure, however, is whether recognizing a mandatory 
disclosure obligation in the case of corporate political spending would fit 
appropriately within existing common law corporate duties or conflict with 
federal securities laws.  After all, there is no overarching federal corporate 
law.229  The disclose or abstain rule articulated in the context of insider 
trading ultimately rests on the statutory foundation of the federal securities 
laws—a detailed regulatory regime focused on disclosure obligations that 
could possibly preempt any new state common law disclosure rule. 
If federal securities laws preempt or trump more stringent common law 
disclosure obligations, the basic project of articulating a fiduciary duty of 
disclosure for corporate political speech becomes futile.230  The federal 
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securities laws purposefully aim to provide uniform and consistent 
standards of transparency for publicly traded companies.231  To that end, 
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“the Uniform 
Standards Act”) preempts many state law securities fraud provisions and 
requires bringing claims for securities fraud in federal court.232  
Nonetheless, even under the Uniform Standards Act, many state law claims 
remain valid, including derivative actions based on violations of 
shareholder voting and appraisal rights, as well as incomplete or deceitful 
communications by the company.233  Pursuant to the widely accepted 
“internal affairs doctrine,” issues of general corporate governance arising 
under state law are not preempted by federal securities laws.234  As a result, 
despite the basic intent of the federal securities laws to provide a uniform 
disclosure regime, they do not foreclose the recognition of additional 
disclosure duties based on state common law principles.235 
Delaware, the state of incorporation for more than half of all domestic 
public companies,236 provides the leading example of a substantial 
fiduciary-based disclosure obligation that goes further than federal 
securities mandates.237  For some time, Delaware common law duties of 
loyalty and good faith have required full and accurate communication with 
company stockholders on matters requiring shareholder action.238  A much 
broader disclosure duty that applies to general communication with 
shareholders, however, was announced by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Malone v. Brincat.239  That common law disclosure duty applies even when 
the subject matter of the communication implicates areas that the federal 
securities laws regulate.240 
In Malone, shareholders complained that company directors breached 
their Delaware common law duty of disclosure by filing false financial 
reports with the SEC and regularly conveying to stockholders inaccurate 
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information about the company’s finances.241  Despite upholding the lower 
court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that 
“Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive false 
communications from directors even in the absence of a request for 
shareholder action.  When the directors are not seeking shareholder action, 
but are deliberately misinforming shareholders about the business of the 
corporation, . . . there is a violation of fiduciary duty.”242  Citing the Senate 
committee report on the Uniform Securities Act that explicitly recognized 
the import of state law disclosure duties,243 the Delaware Supreme Court 
couched its recognition of a fiduciary-based disclosure obligation as 
“complementary” to the mandatory disclosure obligations under the federal 
securities law regime.244  The very persistence of such a strong state 
common law disclosure duty in Delaware reveals that substantial 
jurisprudential room exists for embracing fiduciary disclosure duties 
without offending federal mandates. 
To be sure, a vigorous debate exists regarding the effectiveness of 
flexible common law principles in efficiently regulating corporate 
behavior.245  Some scholars suggest that the inherent ability of organic 
common law standards to adapt to changing social circumstances more 
quickly than legislative mandates246 necessarily leads to inconsistency and 
indeterminacy.247  But in the case of a common law disclose or abstain rule 
for corporate political spending, no such indeterminacy should exist in light 
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of the ostensible materiality to politically concerned shareholders of even 
small amounts of political spending.248  As a result, the rule would naturally 
enjoy a consistent and clear application across jurisdictions. 
IV.  POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Do corporations have a constitutional right under the First Amendment to 
engage in anonymous political spending?  No matter how important 
transparency remains to the ability of corporate managers to fulfill their 
fiduciary obligations, the Constitution could trump and trample the rules 
governing the most basic organizational relationships within the modern 
corporation.  Understanding whether a common law political spending 
disclosure rule might pass constitutional muster requires a brief explication 
of the various standards of scrutiny applied to corporate speech and the 
current First Amendment battleground over politically tinged corporate 
disclosures, as well as an assessment of the potential harm to corporate 
interests through disclosure. 
A.  Wobbly Rungs of Corporate Speech Protection 
Adopting an analytical framework resembling the tripartite standards of 
review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,249 
the Supreme Court applies three distinct levels of judicial scrutiny to 
corporate speech.  If corporate speech relates simply to a commercial 
transaction, the Court applies one of the two lower levels of scrutiny.250  In 
contrast, regulations touching corporate political speech receive strict 
scrutiny.  What makes the three rungs of constitutional review so wobbly is 
the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate what constitutes commercial 
speech, political speech, or the boundaries between them.251  As 
corporations increasingly engage in an artful alchemy of mixing just 
enough political content with otherwise commercial messages in order to 
evade regulation or liability, predicting which level of scrutiny the Supreme 
Court might apply poses quite a difficult task.252 
The lowest rung of constitutional review applies when the government 
requires uncontroversial, purely factual commercial disclosures that 
promote public access to complete and accurate information.253  In 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
 
 248. See supra Part II.D. 
 249. For a general description of the levels of protection afforded under the Equal 
Protection Clause, see Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal 
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 (2011). 
 250. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976). 
 251. See Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an 
Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613, 616–21 
(2006). 
 252. See id. 
 253. See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 218–19 (2011). 
2756 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Ohio,254 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a 
governmental requirement that attorney advertisements disclose their fees 
for legal representation.  After determining that the information subject to 
disclosure was purely factual, the Court upheld the regulation as 
“reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of 
consumers.”255  Although the Constitution often abhors government-
compelled speech,256 disclosure obligations targeting purely commercial 
facts do not receive significant judicial scrutiny. 
On the second rung of commercial speech review, the Supreme Court 
employs an intermediate scrutiny test when government prohibits, rather 
than compels, commercial speech.  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Services Commission,257 the Court struck down a regulation 
banning all advertising by a utility company after articulating a multipart 
test to assess whether commercial speech deserves protection.258  
According to the Court, governmental restriction of commercial speech that 
otherwise relates to a lawful activity and is not misleading will be upheld 
only if the regulation directly advances a substantial governmental interest 
and is no more extensive than necessary.259  Although the Court asserted 
that commercial speech deserved less protection under the First 
Amendment than other forms of protected expression,260 the intermediate 
level of scrutiny announced in Central Hudson has produced inconsistent 
results.261  In some cases, substantial regulation of commercial speech is 
permitted, while in other contexts, courts afford broad protection to 
commercial speech even in the face of significant state interests.262 
At the top of the jurisprudential ladder, the Supreme Court applies strict 
scrutiny to instances of compelled corporate political speech.  Although 
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding corporate political speech remains a 
bit murky, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of 
California263 and Citizens United establish in tandem that the First 
Amendment affords the greatest protection to political commercial speech.  
In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court struck down a California law that 
required a utility company to include in its billing statements newsletters 
from third parties opposed to the company’s viewpoints.264  Casting aside 
the state’s assertion that companies could be compelled to disseminate 
unwanted political content, the plurality opinion noted that “[t]he identity of 
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the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. 
Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the 
‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the 
First Amendment seeks to foster.”265  The Court found that the regulation 
granting third parties the right to include in the utility company’s mailings 
unwanted political messages was not a “narrowly tailored means of serving 
a compelling state interest.”266  Thus, despite the otherwise clear 
commercial purpose of the mailings, the required inclusion of an unwanted 
policy statement created an amalgam of commercial and political content 
deserving strict scrutiny.267 
In contrast to the compelled political speech examined in Pacific Gas, 
Citizens United addressed the First Amendment right of corporations to 
engage in voluntary political speech.268  Citizens United involved a 
challenge to section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA), which banned corporate expenditures for speech that expressly 
advocated the election or defeat of a candidate for office within thirty days 
of a primary or sixty days of a general election.269  Citizens United sought a 
declaratory judgment against the BCRA provisions because it intended to 
distribute a documentary film criticizing then-presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton within the restricted time period of section 203.  In determining that 
BCRA section 203 violated the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
stated:  “Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ 
which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a 
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”270  
Emphasizing that strict scrutiny would apply to any regulation that 
encumbers political speech, whether by a person or a corporation,271 the 
Court also overruled prior precedent in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce,272 in which the Court previously embraced a concern about the 
deleterious effects of corporate influence over the electoral process.273  
Taken together, Pacific Gas and Citizens United suggest that strict scrutiny 
will apply to government regulations that prohibit or compel corporate 
political speech. 
Most certainly, this very brief explication does not intend to provide a 
full or nuanced analysis of prevailing corporate speech jurisprudence.  
Instead, the description of the somewhat vague First Amendment standards 
 
 265. Id. at 8 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
 266. Id. at 19. 
 267. See Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 
847, 874–75 n.168 (2011) (positing that Pacific Gas requires applying strict scrutiny in cases 
of compelled disclosure that involve an amalgam of “commercial and fully protected 
expression”). 
 268. See generally Siebecker, supra note 15 (discussing the speech doctrine embedded in 
Citizens United). 
 269. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2012). 
 270. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to 
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
 271. Id. at 342–45. 
 272. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. 
 273. Id. at 660. 
2758 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
surrounding corporate political speech simply describes the basic lay of the 
land on the existing battleground regarding corporate political 
disclosures.274 
B.  The Political Disclosure Battleground 
A pitched battle over corporate political disclosures has already begun, as 
corporations and business groups assert that the securities laws force 
disclosure of corporate political speech without a compelling governmental 
interest.  After all, the securities laws require much more than disclosure of 
raw financial data.275  In addition to purely factual commercial information, 
the securities laws compel a corporation to disclose qualitative information 
regarding the company’s code of ethics,276 business operations,277 
competitive risks,278 legal proceedings,279 internal controls over financial 
data,280 executive compensation policies,281 and management’s discussion 
and analysis of the company’s financial conditions and operations.282  As 
thoroughly detailed in academic literature, many of those mandatory 
disclosures touch upon inherently political matters and thus provide a 
powerful platform for asserting First Amendment claims.283  Describing a 
few recent significant cases reveals that until the Supreme Court articulates 
more clearly the definitions of commercial speech and political speech, and 
the boundaries between them, corporations will continue to attack the 
mandatory disclosures essential to maintain the integrity of the capital 
markets under the flag of the First Amendment. 
First, in Business Roundtable v. SEC,284 the Business Roundtable and 
other business groups attacked the validity of new SEC Rule 14a-11 that 
gave certain large shareholders the right to nominate directors on the 
corporation’s proxy statement.285  Prior to promulgation of Rule 14a-11, 
management unilaterally controlled who could stand for election for the 
board of directors.286  Affording even some shareholders additional 
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electoral rights within the internal political workings of the corporation 
marked a significant step toward promoting corporate democracy and 
accountability.287 
With respect to the standard of review, a jurisprudential brawl ensued.  
Arguing that the rule compelled content-based speech in conflict with 
management’s commercial and noncommercial interests,288 the Business 
Roundtable urged the D.C. Circuit to apply strict scrutiny under Pacific 
Gas.  Under that standard, the Business Roundtable asserted that the new 
director-nomination Rule violated the First Amendment289 because it was 
not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest and because it 
directly conflicted with prior Supreme Court precedent invalidating 
compelled political speech.290  In an amicus brief, a group of law professors 
argued that the intermediate scrutiny test in Central Hudson should 
apply.291  Contending that strong policy concerns related to maintaining the 
integrity of the capital markets required much of the securities regulation 
regime to inhabit an island of immunity from First Amendment review,292 
the law professors argued that the new rule should pass constitutional 
muster.293 
Considering the increasing importance of a corporation’s moral, ethical, 
and political commitments to shareholders, the election of directors who 
ultimately shape those commitments certainly seemed to touch a political 
chord.294  Avoiding any need to tread into the jurisprudential thicket of 
corporate political speech rights, however, the D.C. Circuit invalidated Rule 
14a-11 based on the SEC’s failure to conduct a sufficient cost-benefit 
analysis prior to promulgating the rule.295  Although the SEC decided not to 
appeal,296 Business Roundtable provides a clear indicator that business 
interests remain focused on using the First Amendment to rend apart any 
regulations that encumber corporate political speech rights. 
 
of democracy endured for only 72 years.  In American business it is timeless.”) [https:// 
perma.cc/LM33-TLCA]. 
 287. See Siebecker, supra note 15, at 220–25. 
 288. See Opening Brief of Petitioners Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States of America at 56–57, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014800, at *56–57. 
 289. Id. at 58–59. 
 290. Id. at 57–58. 
 291. Law Professors’ Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 496548 [hereinafter 
Law Professors’ Brief]. 
 292. Id. at 8 n.7 (“Considering the extraordinary importance of the securities regulations 
regime to American society and the inextricability of the link between speech regulations 
and the basic functioning of that institution, a strong institutional argument supports carving 
out from the First Amendment’s reach the system of mandatory disclosure and reporting 
embedded in the U.S. securities laws.” (quoting Siebecker, supra note 251, at 672)). 
 293. Id. at 8–9. 
 294. See Siebecker, supra note 15, at 163–69, 208–25. 
 295. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1155–56. 
 296. Press Release, SEC, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Shapiro on Proxy Access 
Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/6XHS-KLE4]. 
2760 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Second, in American Petroleum Institute v. SEC,297 the American 
Petroleum Institute (API) and other business associations challenged on 
First Amendment grounds new SEC Rule 13q that required reporting 
companies to disclose payments made to governmental entities in 
connection with the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals.298  API urged the D.C. District Court to apply strict scrutiny 
under Pacific Gas299 because the rule was designed to promote the purely 
political goal of “empower[ing] citizens of . . . resource-rich countries to 
hold their governments accountable for the wealth generated by those 
resources.”300  Using that standard, API argued that the court must strike 
down Rule 13q because enlightening the world regarding the potential 
corruption of foreign governments did not advance a compelling interest of 
the United States and, in any event, less burdensome means to achieve that 
political goal were available.301 
Once again avoiding the need to reach the roiling corporate speech 
claims, the Court struck down Rule 13q on the same failure to conduct an 
appropriate cost-benefit analysis.302  The SEC decided not to appeal the 
decision.303  Nonetheless, the case represents another clear example of 
corporations attempting to use the First Amendment to evade unwanted 
disclosures. 
Finally, in National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC,304 the D.C. Circuit 
announced that compelled disclosure under the securities laws of inherently 
ideological corporate commitments violates the First Amendment.305  In 
that case, the National Association of Manufactures (NAM), along with 
other business groups, challenged on corporate free speech grounds new 
SEC Rule 13p,306 which required companies to disclose if its products were 
not “DRC conflict free” (defined as “products that do not contain minerals 
that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups” in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country).307  Although 
the lower court determined that the regulation passed constitutional muster 
under Central Hudson because Rule 13p directly promoted Congress’s 
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substantial governmental interest in promoting peace and security around 
the Congo,308 the circuit court disagreed.309  With respect to the standard of 
review, the court rejected the SEC’s claim that the conflict mineral rule 
deserved the lowest level scrutiny under Zauderer, considering the 
mandated disclosure was simply factual and related to the state’s interest in 
preventing deception of consumers.310  Instead, the court stated that it was 
“far from clear that the description at issue—whether a product is ‘conflict 
free’—is factual and non-ideological”311 and that “[t]he label ‘conflict free’ 
is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war.”312  The 
court avoided a determination of whether such an ideological disclosure 
regulation deserved strict scrutiny by determining that the regulation failed 
even the intermediate scrutiny test articulated under Central Hudson.313  
Specifically, the court determined that the SEC did not present sufficient 
evidence that less restrictive means than the “conflict free” description 
would fail to accomplish the SEC’s goals underlying the regulation.314  The 
SEC recently chose not to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.315  As 
a result, it remains unclear exactly what level of scrutiny might apply to the 
host of securities laws that compel disclosure of politically tinged corporate 
information. 
C.  Anonymous Corporate Political Activity 
So what would be the likely fate of a common law disclosure rule 
targeting corporate political spending?  Despite the ruling in National Ass’n 
of Manufacturers, strong arguments support the notion that a disclosure rule 
simply requiring corporations to report the identity and amount of political 
expenditures should easily pass First Amendment scrutiny. 
Even if Central Hudson remains the appropriate standard of review, a 
common law corporate political spending disclosure rule would very likely 
satisfy each prong of the test.  To pass constitutional muster the under 
Central Hudson, the “government must show (1) substantial government 
interest that is; (2) directly and materially advanced by [the] restriction; and 
(3) that [the] restriction is narrowly tailored.”316  Preventing executives 
from using corporate coffers to advance personal ends in breach of 
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fiduciary duties to shareholders promotes corporate and democratic 
accountability, protects the integrity of the capital markets, and sustains the 
viability of the $45 trillion market for CSR.317  Each of those interests 
represents a substantial—if not compelling—governmental interest.318  
Moreover, disclosure of a corporation’s political spending clearly advances 
those interests by eliminating the ability of corporate managers to defraud 
or dissemble.  And to the extent a common law disclosure rule simply 
requires disclosure of the identity and amount of corporate political 
expenditures, not only would the rule be narrowly tailored but it would be 
the only means that adequately advances the governmental interests at 
stake.  Considering the intensity of consumer and investor preferences 
regarding a corporation’s political commitments, disclosure of the 
recipients and amounts of corporate political spending provides the absolute 
minimum to ensure fiduciary accountability, trust in the capital markets, 
and the viability of the market for CSR.319 
A potential counterargument might focus on the right to anonymous 
political speech.  Although the Supreme Court has certainly embraced a 
right to anonymous political speech in certain contexts,320 the mere 
disclosure of corporate political expenditures does not implicate the 
essential concerns that animate a need for anonymity.  In Doe v. Reed,321 a 
case in which individual signers of a referendum sought a preliminary 
injunction prohibiting the State of Washington from making referendum 
petitions available in response to requests under the state public records act, 
the Supreme Court held that the disclosure requirements survived strict 
scrutiny under the First Amendment because they substantially advanced 
the important governmental interest in preserving the integrity of the 
electoral process.322  In discussing the contexts in which compelled 
disclosure of political support can run constitutionally aground, the Court 
stated, “[W]e have explained that those resisting disclosure can prevail 
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under the First Amendment if they can show ‘a reasonable probability that 
the compelled disclosure [of personal information] will subject them to 
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private 
parties.’”323  Citing Citizens United, the Court noted that that disclosure of 
political activity by an organization would be similarly impermissible if the 
members of the organization would face similar harm.324 
Requiring a corporation to disclose the mere fact of its political spending 
will not expose the shareholders (i.e., the ultimate owners of the 
corporation) to threats, harassment, or reprisals by government.  The only 
actors who might face sanctions as a result of disclosure are executives who 
have breached a fiduciary duty in directing for personal gain the secret 
political ends to which the corporate treasury might be used.  That very 
ability to hold corporate managers accountable represents an important 
animating concern in affording corporations such broad political speech 
rights in Citizens United.325  Again, as Justice Kennedy asserted: 
[P]rompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens 
with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials 
accountable for their positions and supporters.  Shareholders can 
determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the 
corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether 
elected officials are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.”326 
Such an appreciation for corporate transparency and accountability would 
seem bizarre at best if a constitutional right to secret corporate political 
spending loomed in the background. 
Thus, not only does adopting a common law disclosure rule for political 
spending similar to the basic disclose or abstain rule in the insider trading 
context seem necessary and feasible within existing corporate law 
constructs, the rule would not adulterate the political speech rights 
corporations enjoy under the First Amendment. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
Incorporating a disclose or abstain rule for corporate political spending 
into the basic common law fiduciary duties governing directors and officers 
would afford significant benefits to the corporation, the capital markets, and 
the political community. 
A.  Corporate and Democratic Accountability 
Perhaps most obviously, requiring corporations to disclose their political 
spending would engender greater accountability of corporate managers to 
shareholder interests.  As the Supreme Court and so many scholars, market 
professionals, policymakers, and interest groups fervently contend, only 
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with disclosure of corporate political activity can shareholders ensure that 
executives are not using the corporate treasury for personal gain.  Allowing 
corporate political spending to remain secret can only serve the cause of 
obfuscation and facilitate breaches of core fiduciary duties.  Quite simply, 
there can be no trust without transparency. 
But the corporate accountability at stake goes even further than enabling 
detection of culpability.  The corporation itself has evolved from “a simple 
investment vehicle to an increasingly dominant force” in shaping some of 
the most important economic, social, and political aspects of our lives.327  
Indeed, corporations encroach so deeply into territory once solely occupied 
by government that boardroom deliberations supplant debates in the 
traditional public sphere as the relevant battleground for determining the 
path of our collective lives.328  Although shareholders traditionally occupy 
passive roles in directing corporate affairs, a vital movement to enhance 
shareholder democracy continues to flourish so that shareholder preferences 
can be adequately taken into account before crafting corporate strategies 
and policies.  Only through mechanisms that enhance discourse between 
corporate managers and shareholders (and arguably other relevant consumer 
and stakeholder constituencies that affect shareholder interests) can officers 
and directors ensure fidelity to the corporate interests that they are bound to 
represent.  Secrecy necessarily undermines the accountability and 
attentiveness corporate managers must afford their shareholder constituents.  
And without the transparent discourse that enables such attentiveness, the 
path the corporation takes risks running far afield of shareholders’ intended 
destination. 
Moreover, in light of the great power corporations wield in the political 
realm, transparency regarding corporate political spending remains 
necessary to ensure legitimacy in the polity.  Citizens United explicitly 
connected democratic accountability with the ability of citizens to 
determine if elected officials might be corrupted by corporate influences.329  
Because the corporation has become so institutionally important to our 
collective political identity, “the integrity of [the corporation’s] 
organizational structure significantly affects, if not controls, the confidence 
in our democratic processes.  If special interests, managerial imperialism, or 
other antidemocratic values dominate corporations, we will realize a 
diminished sense of citizenship within our polity.”330  Clandestine corporate 
political spending encourages corruption rather than constructive civic 
participation.331  As a result, a common law disclose or abstain rule for 
corporate political spending could go a long way to protect the basic 
legitimacy and integrity of our political processes. 
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B.  Efficiency and the Market 
for Corporate Social Responsibility 
Without the ability of investors and consumers to trust in the accuracy of 
corporate disclosures regarding environmental, social, and governance 
matters, the market for CSR will collapse.  Considering that more than $6.5 
trillion in the United States currently gets invested based on socially 
responsible screening criteria,332 such a market failure would cause 
significant economic loss.  Enabling corporations to hide their political 
practices creates a regulatory regime fit only for charlatans and chumps.  
An incentive would exist for corporations to attempt to curry investor or 
consumer favor by publicly embracing a political position and privately 
supporting a contrary commitment or candidate without fear of negative 
repercussions.333  But even some of the cleverest fraudulent schemes 
eventually come to light.  And as consumers and investors become more 
inured to corporate greenwashing and the projection of false corporate 
images, the entire market for CSR will seem like nothing more than a circus 
sham.  As the Supreme Court famously noted, “[I]t is hard to imagine that 
there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity.  Who 
would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”334 
In contrast, transparency regarding corporate political spending will 
necessarily enhance corporate efficiency.  Efficient corporate governance 
rules reflect what corporate managers, shareholders, and other 
nonshareholder constituencies would hypothetically negotiate in a world of 
perfect information, freedom of contract, and zero transaction costs.335  Of 
course, the reality of our world prevents those conditions from obtaining.  
As a result, determining the content of the hypothetical bargain presents 
quite a challenge. 
Even if the precise outcome of the bargain remains a mystery, however, 
transparency necessarily makes an efficient outcome more likely.336  Why?  
On the one hand, if corporate managers are able to engage in political 
activity without any reproach from investors, they will have no incentive to 
take those viewpoints into account when determining what corporate path 
to pursue.  On the other hand, the vulnerability to shareholder action made 
possible by disclosing corporate political spending provides the opposite 
incentive to consider thoughtfully actual shareholder preferences.  To the 
extent corporate rules facilitate the consideration of actual shareholder 
interests (whether on corporate political commitments or any other 
concern), corporate managers more closely track the true preferences of 
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shareholders rather than some stilted idea of shareholders’ interest only in 
wealth maximization.337  Because some shareholders possess (intense) 
preferences for a variety of environmental, social, or other political 
commitments, ignoring the reality of their preferences in shaping corporate 
governance rules disconnects the content of the rule from what real parties 
to the bargain ultimately desire.  A corporate political spending disclosure 
rule would more effectively engage corporate managers in a dialogue with 
shareholders about the extent to which corporations should even engage in 
political activity as well what political beneficiaries best advance the 
ultimate goals of the corporation.338  Through enhanced discourse that pays 
adequate fidelity to the interests of affected corporate constituencies, an 
efficient outcome regarding the content of corporate governance rules 
becomes more likely. 
CONCLUSION 
A strong case seems to support using the same legal principles that 
prohibit insider trading to require corporations to disclose their political 
spending as well.  The growing dominance of corporations in politics, the 
lack of transparency regarding corporate political activity, and inevitable 
suspicions about the motives of corporate executives in using corporate 
coffers to advance their personal interests provides the impetus for such 
jurisprudential action. 
Using the fiduciary principles of trust that animate prohibitions on insider 
trading does not seem particularly odd as a tool to inform the content of the 
general fiduciary duties that corporate officers and directors owe to their 
shareholders.  After all, the basic abstain or disclose rule that the Supreme 
Court recognizes in the context of insider trading arises from the common 
law fiduciary duties that govern the daily decisions of corporate managers.  
A fiduciary breach due to secret use of corporate assets for personal gain 
marks the essential concern in both the insider trading realm and in the 
context of corporate political spending.  Thus, adopting a similar common 
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law fiduciary rule that corporate managers must disclose the amount and 
target of political expenditures or refrain from engaging in political activity 
does not seem like much of an intellectual leap.  Not only would such a 
common law disclosure duty fit neatly within existing corporate governance 
principles, but the compelled transparency would not offend corporations’ 
First Amendment rights.  In the end, prohibiting political insider trading 
through a disclose or abstain rule for corporate political spending would 
promote greater efficiency in the capital markets, ensure corporate 
accountability and political legitimacy, and sustain the growing market for 
CSR. 
 
